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This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays in microeconomics.
The rst chapter studies a principal-agent model where a biased agent can costly collect information useful
for the principal. I study what is the optimal contract the principal should commit to, when she cannot do
contingent transfers to the agent. When the agent's value of information is higher than its cost, the optimal
mechanism is a threshold delegation rule. The principal allows the agent to choose among all the available
actions up to some threshold. This threshold is increasing in the parameter measuring the cost of information.
Otherwise, the principal will commit to extreme biased behavior to induce information acquisition. The
utility of the principal is non-monotonic in the cost of information. While inducing information acquisition
becomes more dicult with higher cost, certain deviations in the acquisition stage become more expensive
and thus less protable for the agent.
The second chapter is coauthored with Julie Pinole. Knowing that Individuals interact with their peers,
we study how a social planner can intervene, changing these interactions, in order to achieve a particular
objective. When the objective is welfare maximization, we describe the interventions for games of strategic
complements and strategic substitutes. We show that, for strategic complements, the planner uses resources
to target central players; while she divides individuals into separated communities in the case of strategic
substitutes. We study which connections she targets in order to achieve these goals.
The third chapter is coauthored with Julie Pinole and analyzes a model of contagion on social network.
We ask how a social planner should intervene to prevent contagion. We characterize the optimal intervention
and the cost associated. We discuss the intuition behind the choice of the planner and we provide comparative
static on the cost of intervention for dierent type of network.
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Optimal Contracts with No Transfers and
Costly Information Acquisition
1 Introduction
Information is crucial in decision making. Tipically, information is dispersed among various parties and it is
costly to acquire. In the rst case, an informed agent, with dierent preference with respect to a principal,
might try to mislead her by misreporting information. I call this a problem of adverse selection in report.
In the second case, an agent, delegated by a principal might exert too little eort in information acquisition.
I call this a problem of moral hazard in information acquisition.
One of the most interesting and studied situation where these two problems arise is the relation between
the Government and the Bureaucracy. The problem of adverse selection in report might emerge because the
ideology of the Government in charge and the one of an agency are misalligned. Clinton & al. (2011), in an
empirical study, documents US govermental agencies bias, identifying which agency can be considered liberal
and which one conservative. Several reasons might explain the dierence in ideology of various agencies.
Some agencies might be created by a Democratic President, other by a Republican one. The appointees in
each agency might have dierent political vision. Agencies with dierent mission, such as the EPA or the
Defense might attract more liberal or more conservative employees. Instead, the problem of moral hazard
in information acquisition might be caused by the price of information. Even if it is dicult to quantify
research eort scholars (See Stephenon (2011) for example) point out that Boreaucrats might invest time
and resources to improve decision making. Data collection, study of academic literature, consultation of
outside parties, implementation of pilote projects are all examples of how an agent can access to information
by paying a price.
The principal can oer a performance-based contract in order to mitigate these two kind of problems.
Rewarding the agent for correct and precise information is a way for the principal to soften both the adverse
selection in report and the moral hazard in information acquisition. There are, however, several environments
where this is not possible. Policies might have long-term outcome making it dicult to reward an agent.
Finally, it might be dicult to measure the benet of a policy for each individual in the society and charging
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him for the cost accordingly. In fact, what we observe (specially in the public sector) is that wages are
mostly xed and independent of policy outcome.
In this paper I analyze the optimal mechanism to which a principal should commit to, when contingent
transfers are ruled out. I describe which channels a principal might use to incentivize correct and precise
information acquisition and transmission in the context of a relatively standard principal-agent framework.
When contingent transfers are ruled out the only way to inuence the decision of the agent for the
principal is to use the incentives of the agent in the project he is evaluating. This implies that, there is
not advantage in keeping the decision power for the principal. In order to incentivise the agent for correct
decision making, the principal should simply select the appropriate action space from which the agent will
choose. The problem I analyze reduces to the choice of a menu of available actions that the principal oers
to the agent.1
At the beginning of the game the principal decides which actions the agent can and cannot take. The
agent, knowing this, decide how much and which type of information to buy. After that, he selects the action
that maximizes his expected payo from the action space. When the principal selects the actions available
to the agent, she does it, taking into consideration both the adverse selection problem due to the conict of
interest and the moral hazard problem due to the cost of information acquisition. It is worth noting that the
presence of a conict of interest between the two players, combined with the cost of information, not only
inuence the action choice of the agent (once the uncertainty is realized) but it critically shapes the type of
information the agent acquires.
Specically, the agent can partition the state space into intervals and learn in which of them the State
of the World falls. I call each partition an investigation. The cost of each investigation is the product of a
parameter measuring the expertise of the agent performing the investigation times the decrease of uncertainty
associated to the investigation. I assume that the more informative an investigation is, the more the agent
will have to pay. Furthermore, agents dier in their expertize to perform the investigation. An agent is more
expert with respect to an other one if he is able to perform any investigation at a lower cost. An alternative
interpretation is to think of the cost of an investigation obtained as a parameter measuring how dicult is
the problem we want to solve times the dicrease of uncertainty associated to the investigation.
If the principal could buy herself information, at the same cost as the agent, she would buy an investigation
as long as the expected value of information would be smaller than the cost. I say that an agent is one that
1For a similar argument see Holmstrom (1978), Green & Stokey (1981), Melumad & Shibano (1991) and Szalay (2005).
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has low cost of information acquisition when this condition is satised. Alternatively I can think that we
are facing a problem that requires information at low cost. I show that, as long as the cost of information
is low the optimal contract is a threshold delegation rule. The principal let the agent take any action into
a certain interval, whose bound are a function of the cost of information. The higher is the cost, the more
the principal decides to delegate (make the bounds less binding). The principal rewards the agent, for
information acquisition, giving more decision power, letting the agent make better use of the information he
learns.
There are several situations where we can observe the kind of (threshold delegation) rule I obtained.
In the Government-Bureaucrat relation Gailmard (2008) documents how, in the U.S., the legislature can
create a "window of discretion for agencies to select policies. Examples are the Transportation Act of 1920,
delegating the Interstate Commerce Commission to set rail rates but only for specic routes or the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970 giving the EPA the possibility to set limits on pollutants but with thight
restrictions dierent from region to region. 2
When the cost of information is high I ask whether it is possible to induce information acquisition. If the
principal would have to buy herself information she would not do it, as the value would not cover the cost.
Given that the cost of information is bared by the agent, the principal might neverthless want to induce
information acquisition. First, I show that the principal can induce only a reduced amount of information
acquisition. The idea is that the moral hazard problem in information acquisition is now very severe, making
underinvesment in information acquisition dicult to rule out. Finally, I show that the optimal choice for
the principal is to make the agent choose among two extreme actions (far from the expectation of the prior).
The agent, facing two very risky choices, will be better o acquiring information. By removing a safety
net to the agent the principal forces him to invest in acquisition. When there is no conict of interest
between the two parties the principal makes the agent choose among two symmetric actions. In this case
there exists only a problem of moral hazard in acquisition. The more accurate the information that the
agent buys the better it is for the principal. When there is a conict of interest between the players the
optimal rule is dierent. The principal makes the agent chooses among two extreme actions that are biased
in favor of the agent's preference. Counter intuitively, the principal might not induce the agent to buy very
accurate information. In fact, it is possible that the principal promotes favorable use of information ex-post
2High level manager often delegate to lower levels' ones but setting some limits on investment or hiring decisions. Judges
are often constrained in the lenght of the sentence they choose.
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sacricing ecient acquisition ex-ante3. An high cost makes information acquisition dicult (the moral
hazard problem is severe) on one side, but could make some deviations, during the acquisition phase, less
protable and therefore mitigate the adverse selection problem.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 compare the paper with the related literature. Section 3 lays





Crawford and Sobel (1984) ask what are the equilibria of a communication game where an informed agent can
send messages to an uninformed principal taking an action aecting the payos of both players. Melumad
& Shibano(1991) and Goltsman & al. (2009) study what happens in the Crawford and Sobel (1984) cheap
talk's model when the principal has commitment but cannot do contingent transfers to the agent. In their
model, as in Crawford and Sobel(1984) information is exogenously given. The agent enters in the game
knowing what is the State of the World. The principal select a menu of actions from which the agent takes
his choice. They found that the principal optimally chooses a threshold delegation rule. She allows the agent
to take any action in a convex interval with bounds dependent on the parameter measuring the misalignment
of preferences between the two players. My model is a generalization of theirs, as information is expensive
to acquire. When the cost of the cost of acquisition goes to zero the results I obtain coincide with theirs.
The principal, in the game studied by Melumad & Shibano(1991) and Goltsman & al. (2009), using her
commitment power, tries to solve the problem of adverse selection caused by the conict of interest between
her and the agent. The additional diculty present in my model is that the principal will have to takle also
the moral hazard problem caused by the price of information.
Recently, Di Pei (2015), Argenziano & al (2016) and Deimen & Szalay (2017) endogenize information
acquisition in communication. They study cheap talk models with costly information acquisition. The
three models dier in the technology that the agent can use to collect information. The peculiarity of the
technology used to collect information in the model of Di Pei (2015) is that the agent can address search
eort in the state space. For example, he can choose to have very detailed information when the State of
the World is extreme and only a low informative signal when the State of the World is moderate. I use the
framework of Di Pei (2015) to study how a principal with commitmment and without the possibility of doing
contingent transfers should optimally delegate to the agent.
Szalay (2005) studies the problem of how a principal can induce information acquisition by an agent. He
found that commitment to extreme behavior by the principal can induce information acquisition. Reducing
the number of choices for an agent can induce him to invest in information. The model studied by Szalay
(2005) diers from mine in, at least, two dimension. First, in Szalay (2015) there is no conict of interest
between the players. Only the moral hazard component is present. Finally, the technology used to collect
information by the agent is dierent. These two dierent assumptions imply dierent results. First, in the
optimal contract, in Szalay (2015), the agent choose among a continuous of actions, while I show that for
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high cost the agent will face a binary (Low or High) choice. Second, in Szalay (2005), the principal never
oers a threshold delegation contract, as it happens in my model when the cost of information is low. Finally,
given the absence of the adverse selection problem, in Szalay (2005), a lower cost of information is always
preferred by the principal.
The paper contributes to the large literature on mechanism design with endogenous information. An-
gelucci (2017) studies the interesting problem of how to incentive two dierent agents to collect information
in a model similar to Szalay (2015). Li (2001), Gerardi & Yariv (2008) Cai (2009), Gershkov & Szentes
(2009) study mechanism design with endogenous information in collective decision-making.
The economics literature has focused on methods to solve the adverse selection problem alone or the
moral hazard problem alone, not considering how these two aspects combine together. I show how using
only one instrument to solve the two problems results in a inevitable trade-o between promoting ecient
use of information ex-post and stimulating ecient acquisition ex-ante.4
Referring to this problem Sobel (2011) says I am unaware of studies that characterize optimal institutions
for acquisition and transmission of endogenously generated information for the model ... This is a natural
question for future research.



































In this section I present the model.













is chosen in state θ the Principal gets utility U (a, θ) = − (a− θ)2




5 measures the misalignment of preferences
between the two players. The Principal wants to match the state while the agent has some bias towards
high actions..







agent buys ψ ∈ Ψ he learns in which subset of ψ the state falls. For nite partition we have
ψ =
{
[θ0, θ1] , (θ1, θ2] , ..., (θn−1, θn] , with −
1
2





The agent learns that θ ∈ (θi−1, θi] after the acquisition of the information partition. The acquisition
stage is not observable by the principal and the total utility of the agent is given by the payo from the
action minus the cost of buying the partition.
Assumption 1. The cost to buy a partition ψ is






where µ0 (Θ) is the Lebesgue measure of the interval Θ belonging to the partition ψ.
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The previous expression is based on the assumption that a more informative partition is more expensive
to acquire. The following remarks and the discussion in Appendix B elaborates on this.
To x ideas, imagine that an agent choose an n − elements partition of the state space ψ. Then






. After the acquisition of the partition ψ the agent's posterior would be
θ ∼ U [θi − θi−1] , with probability (θi − θi−1) . Each posterior distribution has as variance 112 (θi − θi−1)
2.
5I consider the range of bias b for which in Crawford & Sobel (1982) there exists a non-bubbling equilibrium.
6Note that, dierentely from Di Pei (2015) we allow the agent to buy partitions made of innite elements. This implies that,







is a set of nonempty subsets














7The denition of the sum over an uncountable set is an abuse of notation.
Note, however that the sum would be always ≤ 1 and it can be µ0(Θ) > 0 only for a nite number of indeces Φ.















Hence, given ψ, the expected variance of the posteriors is given by
∑
i (θi − θi−1)
1
12 (θi − θi−1)
2
. When the
agent has no access to information his posterior would be equal to his prior θ ∼ U [θi − θi−1] so that the



















= 112 . Lower expected
variance in the posteriors is associated to higher cost.8
The choice to take a cubic cost function9 is particularly appealing in this setting as it turns out that if
the problem would be a single-agent problem, ie the principal would buy himself information, the cost of an
information partition would be proportional to its value. We can, in fact, in this case compute the value of




























(θi − θi−1)3 − 1
)
. (3.3)
In such a setting it should be clear that the principal would invest in information acquisition (acquiring
the nest possible partition of the state space) as long as c ≤ 112 while no information should be acquired
when c > 112 . The point c =
1
12 is where an hypotetical single-agent would be indierent between buying
information or not. In the analysis that follows I will say that the cost of information is low if c < 112 and
that the cost of information is high if c > 112 .




















8Other choices of the cost function would be coherent with the notion of informativeness in terms of Blackwell theory. Check
Appendix B for a further discussion.
9Check Di Pei (2015) for a further discussion.
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FIG.1 The cost function
It should be clear that c (ψ) < c (ψ′) and c (ψ′) > c (ψ′′) . The assumption on the cubic cost function rank
also c (ψ) < c (ψ′′) as the expected variance of the posteriors' distributions is lower in ψ′′ wrt ψ.
The way we should interpret the ranking between ψ and ψ′′ is that it is more informative a signal ψ
that, with the same probability, gives an accurate measure of the state wrt one (ψ′′) that gives with a low
probability a very precise information and with an high probability a non-precise information. In Appendix
B I show that this is consistent with a large class of cost function and I show what happens to some of the
main results when I remove this assumption
Finally, I assume that it is not possible for the principal to do transfers to the agent.
Before the agent invests in information acquisition the principal has the possibility to commit to a
mechanism. That is, she species a message space M such that, if the agent choose m ∈M she plays a(m).
Timing
1. Principal chooses M, and for any m ∈M commit to a (m) ;
2. Agent buys ψ ∈ Ψ and learns that θ ∈ Θ;10
3. Agent chooses m ∈M and the Principal perform a (m) ;
4. Payos are realized.
4 The Problem of the Principal
Given the nature of the problem and the impossibility of doing transfers; the principal cannot do better than
choosing a subset of the action space from which the agent will select an action.11 There is, in fact, no gain
in keeping decision-power for the principal.12 Hence we can write her problem as follows:








. The Principal solves:
10Only pure-strategy in the acquisition stage
11Check Holmstrom (1978,1984), Green and Stokey (1981), Melumad & Shibano (1991) and Szalay (2005) for a similar
argument and Appendix A for a formal argument.









(a− θ)2 dθ s.to. (4.1)
i) a (Θ) ∈ arg maxa∈Γ −
´
Θ (a− θ − b)
2 dθ




Θ (a (Θ)− θ − b)
2 dθ − c (ψ′)
The principal maximizes her expected utility by choosing which actions to make available to the agent
considering two conditions. The rst is that that the agent, knowing that the state belongs to Θ, will choose
the action that maximizes his expected utility among the actions available in Γ. This mimics a classical
Incentive Compatibility constrain and it refers to what I call adverse selection problem in report. The
second condition is that the agent buys the interval partition that maximizes his expected utility minus the






, Low Cost of Information
First, I want to analyze what happens when the cost to collect information is low.13
Two benchmark cases can help me designing the optimal contract:
• The rst is the case b = 0. The principal, not having any conict of interest with the agent, should leave
complete freedom to him. The agent, being the cost of information low will buy a complete partition
of the state space, he will learn θ and plays a = θ. The principal would get the most informative
information partition chosen by the agent and the action that goes with it, while the agent is willing to
buy it as the cost of it is lower than the benet he gets by choosing an action based on a more precise
posterior.
• When c = 0, Melumad & Shibano (1991) provides a solution for the problem for any b > 0. In fact,
they show that, when the agent knows what is the state, the principal should allow the agent to take
any action below 12 − b. The best way to use the information owned by the agent is, in fact, to delegate
to him for low state states and keeping decision power for high states. The agent will choose an action
a = θ + b as long as θ ≤ 12 − 2b while he will have to choose a =
1
2 − b when θ >
1
2 − 2b. The following
gure illustrates how we can think of this problem in terms of information acquisition: The principal






. The agent learns the exact state for any θ ≤ 12 − 2b, playing
a = θ + b; or he learns that the SoW is between 12 − 2b and
1
2 and plays a =
1
2 − b.





















FIG.2 Optimal rule c = 0, b > 0
I will build on this two specic cases a complete characterization of the optimal contract. The following





















Proof in the Appendix
In order to get some intuition behind this result let me start by observing what happens for low state.
If the principal leaves the decision to the agent he will learn the exact state θ and he will play θ + b. This
is because as long as c ≤ 112 and he can play his favorite action he has an incentive to buy as much
information as possible. This is exactly what was happening in the case of c = 0 described by Melumad &
Shibano (1991). The main dierence will be for high states of the world. In fact, if, as in the case c = 0, I
leave the agent chooses all the actions up to 12 − b he will NOT buy exact information below
1
2 − 2b. He will
instead buy a less informative partition
{
∪x≤ 12−2b−ε {x} ,
[
1




, for some ε > 0, to play 12 − b.
The fact that information is costly creates this additional moral hazard problem for the principal. She
will have to trade o this, with the adverse selection problem. Hence, the principal has to decide whether
to delegate more (or less) to the agent inducing more (or less) information acquisition. The problem boils
down to the search of the last action that she allows the agent to take. The trade-o is solved in favor of













FIG. 3 Optimal rule c > 0, b > 0
The principal prefers to leave the agent decision power (by letting him choose higher actions when the
cost increases) in order to compensate for the expenditure in information acquisition. When the cost of
information acquisition is large the principal will allow the agent to take any action in the action space. The
agent will buy exact information up to some value y and learns θ to play θ + b or learns that the SoW is in[
y, 12
]
and play α (c).
The optimal rule found in Proposition 1 takes the name of threshold delegation rule in the literature.
The dierence with most of the settings14 that have been studied is that the information is endogenously
acquired in this model and therefore the rule depends on the cost of the information acquisition. In the
empirical I.O. literature we nd several examples of top managers delegating using this kind of rule.
An important observation is that, for this range of the costs, the main problem for the principal is the
adverse selection one. In fact, in case b = 0, he would be able to get the rst best15 no matter what is c,
while for b > 0 she looses something (wrt the case c = 0) only for high states.
4.2 c > 1
12
, High Cost of Information
I will rst provide a lemma to characterize the number of actions that the principal can induce the sender
to take.
Lemma 1. • If c > 112 the principal can induce up to 2 dierent actions (or equivalent a partition with
a maximum of 2 elements);
• If c > 13 , Γ = {0} .
14Check Alonso & Matouschek (2007) for a detailed discussion.
15in the sense that ruling out contingent transfers would do not reduce do not reduce the utility of the principal.
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Proof in the Appendix
Note that we could expect that, when c > 112 , there would not be space for the principal to induce the
agent to buy information. In fact, a principal that could acquire information would not do it herself when
c > 112 . This should already suggest that the possibility to induce information acquisition is limited. The
lemma species how binding is this limit.
The idea for the second bullet is that when the cost of collecting information is very high then the agent
will never by any. The only option for the principal in this case is to choose the action that goes with the
expectation of the prior, i.e. a = 0.
In order to get some intuitions for the rst statement let me assume, by contradiction, that the principal
could induce 3 actions and let me show that it exists a protable deviation for the agent.16
WLoG17 suppose that the principal wants to induce two negative actions and a positive one. We should
be able to nd − 12 ≤ a1 < θ1 < a2 < θ2 < a3 ≤
1
2 , with a2 < 0, for some a1, a2 and a3 chosen by the

















FIG. 4 The principal has to rule out deviation ψ′ and ψ′′
As in the gure, the principal would pick an action set Γ with 3 elements and the agent would partition
the state space according to some ψ.
16Meaning that the agent would buy an information partition of 3 elements and he would take one dierent action for any of
the 3 dierent posteriors.
17it is easier to show the existence of a protable deviation when she wants to induce 3 negative (or positive) actions.
13
The rst type of deviation (ψ′) we consider is one where the agent buys
{[










{∥∥∥− 12 +θ22 − a1 − b∥∥∥ ;∥∥∥− 12 +θ22 − a2 − b∥∥∥} or a3.
In order to rule out this deviation we need to impose a condition on the distance between a1 and a2.
When the two actions available for the agent are close one to the other, he will not be able to use eciently
the information he bought. In fact, after learning (at very high cost) in which element of the partition the
state is, it will not make a large dierence to choose a1 instead of a2 if they are close one to the other. Hence,
he prefers to pull the rst the two elements of the partition together. Now, given that a2 has to be distant
enough from a1, an other deviation (ψ
′′) becomes protable.
The agent prefers not to buy information (ψ′′) and plays a2, being this action very closed to the one that
maximizes his utility under the prior distribution.
What the previous lemma implies is that we will only have to look for 2 actions in order to maximize the
principal expected utility. This makes the maximization problem of the principal much easier to deal with.
Before solving for the optimal mechanism, I state the following proposition that characterizes the rule to
which the principal should commit when there is no conict of interest between the two parties.
This intermediary result would help me to get some insights on the general rule (b > 0) and to do a
comparison with the results available in the literature.





















] , where y = 32c.
I can guess and verify the solution. If the principal could induce the two actions − 14 and
1
4 under the
condition that the signal bought by the agent is
{[






we would have the optimal mechanism.
Solving the maximization we can verify that this is the case as long as c < 16 .
In c = 16 the agent would be indierent between buying
{[






and playing a1,a2 (according






















When c is larger than 16 if the principal wants the agent to buy some signal then she has to increase
the distance between the two actions a1 and a2. The principal wants to keep the distance between the two
actions as small as possible with the condition that the agent keeps buying information. She will keep the











c ↑ c ↑







The idea behind this proposition is that by eliminating intermediary actions (committing to extreme
behavior) the principal force the agent to acquire information. This happens because the principal makes
the consequences of what the agent chooses more extreme. This result reminds the ones found in Szalay
(2005) and Angelucci (2017).
It is worth noting that as long as c ≤ 16 the actions available for the agents allows him to fully use the
information he learns. When c > 16 the agent cannot eciently use the information he has damaging also
the principal. For this range of costs the moral hazard problem is extremely severe and as a consequence we
would have mechanism that are ex-post inecient.
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4.2.1 b > 0
I want to understand what happens in a situation where the moral hazard problem (due to high cost of
information acquisition) interacts with an adverse selection problem (conict of interest between the agent
and the principal). The following Proposition characterizes the optimal rule the principal commits to.














such that the principal chooses
Γ = {a1, a2} with

a1 + a2 > 2b, a2 − a1 ≤ 12 if c < c
∗
a1 + a2 = 2b, a2 − a1 = 3c if c ≥ c∗
Proof in the Appendix
In order to get some intuition for this result, I build on the results of Proposition 2.








































ψP1 θP1 = 0
adverse selection
θA1


























18I am considering the cost c close enough to 1
12
.
19The principal wants θP to be the point that is at same the distance between a1 and a2
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would instead be the information partition the principal would like the agent to buy when the actions avaible




measures the adverse selection component of the problem.
If the principal would "correct" for the bias and oers instead Γ2 =
{




the agent would buy
the same information partition he was buying in the case where b = 0. This is the most informative signal
that the principal can induce the agent to buy but the principal would still incure in an adverse selection
















FIG. 8 adjustment for the bias
Proposition 3 tells me that there is a way to reduce this adverse selection probleme and do better for
the principal. The principal should choose two actions (FIG. 9) that are (on average a1 + a2 > 2b) even
more biased than in Γ2, in favour of the bias of the agent. This two actions should have lower distance(
a2 − a1 ≤ 12
)
one from the other wrt to the case where b = 0.
What the proposition suggests is that the principal should choose two actions that are (on average
a1 + a2 > 2b) more biased in favor of the bias of the agent and with a low distance
(
a2 − a1 ≤ 12
)
. If



































































.When the principal makes the 2 actions available close
(
a2 − a1 ≤ 12
)
and over-biased (a1 +a2 > 2b)
the value of information becomes smaller for the agent. The agent will want to save on the cost and he will
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choose an (cheaper) information partition ψ closer to the one that the principal prefers. The reduction of
the adverse selection problem that the principal can obtain in this way comes at the cost of less information
acquisition. In cheap talk models, it might be the case that, a receiver prefers to face a less informed sender.
In fact, more information might create larger adverse selection problems. It is similar in this situation where








no cost of information
FIG. 9 optimal contract
When the cost of information c becomes very large the moral hazard problem becomes very severe and,
as it was happening in the case b = 0, the principal will have to set the two actions a1 and a2 very distant
one from the other. The following corollary species the optimal contract for very large values of c :






















for any c ≤ c∗∗
{0} c > c∗∗
The agent will be indierent between buying or not buying information (a2 − a1 = 3c) and the contract
will look like the one oered in the case where b = 0. The dierence will be that a1 and a2 will be biased in
favor of the agent and the information partition acquired by the agent would be
{[







When c becomes even larger, at some point, the principal prefers not to delegate any information acqui-
sition anymore and choose the action that goes with her prior distribution, i.e. Γ = {0} . 20
Dierently from the case of low cost of information, the impossibility of doing contingent transfers to the
agent aects the utility of the principal both for the adverse selection problem and for the moral hazard one.
20It is possible to determine c∗∗ has the cost for which the principal is indierent between delegating to the agent or taking


























In the previous section I characterized the optimal mechanism for all possible cost and bias. In order to
make some welfare consideration I rst introduce a more general version of the problem. So far, the search
for the optimal rule was taking into consideration only the utility of the principal. The agent is, in fact,
"forced to participate to the mechanism without receiving any benet. If I allow the principal to make at
transfers (not depending on the choice of the agent/realization of the state), I can now impose a participation
constraint for the agent that the principal will have to satisfy. If I think that the agent is an employee of an
agency and the government (the principal) delegates him a job I can assume that the employee could refuse
to take it if he is not compensated to do it. He will incur in the quadratic loss only if he takes the job. His
interest in the outcome of the project could be due to career concerns. If he refuses the job he will not have









(a− θ)2 dθ − t s.to
i) a (Θ) ∈ arg maxa∈Γ′ − (1− λ)
´
Θ (a− θ − b)
2 dθ




Θ (a (Θ)− θ − b)
2 dθ + c (ψ′)
]




Θ (a (Θ)− θ − b)
2 dθ + c (ψ) + t
]
≥ 0
λ measures how much the principal weight the utility from the project wrt the agent (1− λ) . t is the wage
that the principal can pay to the agent and iii) is the participation constraint of the agent.
The new problem seems to be more realistic. In terms of the examples presented in the introduction, t
can be thought as the budget that the state nances for an agency; λ, 1− λ represents how much the state
and the agency care for the outcome of the investigation.
IV.1 largeλ
Note that the solution of the problem for λ close to 1 is exactly what we described in the previous section,
with the little caveat that the principal will have to pay a wage to the agent that exactly compensate for his
expenditure in information acquisition. Being the value for the project innitely higher for the principal with
respect to the agent I should not be surprised that she wants to extract as much as possible from the agent
19
and repay him through a at transfer. The following proposition characterize the utility of the principal as
a function of the cost of information collection:
Proposition 4. Let U measure the expected utility of the principal as in Pλ. There exists a λ
∗ such that
for any λ∗ < λ < 1:
• If b = 0, then dUdc



















• If b > 0, then 21 dUdc










< 0 if c ∈
(
c′, 13
] , where c




Proof in the Appendix
The rst result, for b = 0, is quite intuitive. When there is no conict of interest, the only problem in
communication is a moral hazard problem:




, both the agent and the principal benet from information.







the principal induces the acquisition of a two elements partition not depending on c.







, the moral hazard problem is very high and
the principal has to commit to a mechanism that is ex-post inecient and this cause a loss of utility
when c increases.
When there exists some bias, i.e. b > 0, between the two players we have a result that might seem
surprising: the utility of the principal is NOT monotonically decreasing in the cost of information acquisition.
21Note that this derivative does not exist in the points c = ĉ, c = 1
12
, c = c∗ and c = c∗∗, dened in Proposition 1 and
Proposition 3. Writing dU
dc











FIG. 10 Non-monotonic eect of the cost on the utility of the Principal
1. When information is cheap, more delegation to the agent (as suggested by the optimal mechanism), as
it happens when c increases, makes the principal worse o.
2. When the price of information is high, the moral hazard problem becomes more severe.22 At the same
time the adverse selection problem becomes less strong as deviations in the acquisition stage become
less protable fot the agent. This second eect wins, for a non-empty set of the cost parameters.
3. When the moral hazard problem becomes even more severe the principal is forced to ex-post inecient
contract as in the case of no bias.
This results (in case 2.) suggests that a principal might prefer, in presence of a conict of interest, to
consult an expert that has higher cost of information acquisition.
In order to have a better understanding, consider some c > 112 small enough and b > 0. We know that
the optimal contract is given by some a1, a2 (as described in Proposition 3) and that the agent buys an
information partition ψ =
{[







. When c increases by some small ε > 0 the principal can
still oer the same contract Γ = {a1, a2} and the agent cannot choose θc+ε < θ because it would be too




. Thus, the principal will be better o. Note that when c increases
the principal might decide (and he does) to change a1 and a2, but in any case she will be better o when
the cost of information is c+ ε wrt c.








FIG. 11 Increasing utility
5.1 b = 0
We are not able to characterize the optimal mechanism for any λ ∈ (0, 1) and b > 0 but we nd useful to
explore the case where b = 0. This problem has been studied by Szalay (2005) in an environment where a
dierent types of signals (investigations) could be bought by the agent.
Let denote by Γλ the solution of problem (Pλ) and by Γ the solution of problem (P ) found in the previous
section. The following proposition characterizes the solution (Pλ) , for any λ ∈ (0, 1):




there exists λc ∈ (0, 1) such that
Γλ =

Γ if λ ≥ λc
{0} if λ < λc
and λc is increasing in c.
Proof in the Appendix
If the value of the project for the principal is not so high, she will not ask the agent to collect information
when the cost of doing so is large. On the opposite she will enforce information collection when the project
is particularly important and the cost is relatively small.23
Note that this result does not extend naturally when there is some bias b > 0 . We can, in fact conjecture
that the principal might want to change the set Γ according to the value of λ and c. For example he might
23This result is slightly dierent from the one obtained in Szalay (2005), as he was obtaining a smooth transition between
the two regimes Γλ = Γ and Γ = {0} . This is because of the dierent assumptions on the information collection technology
and the cost function associated to it.
22
want to induce some information partition that are cheap for the agent or try to repay him by delegating
more that in the benchmark case. This might be a question for further research.
6 Conclusions
I study the optimal mechanism a principal should commit to in an environment where a biased agent can
costly acquire information. The adverse selection in the reporting of information and the moral hazard due





The optimal mechanism can be seen as a form of delegation to the agent with some form of discretion.






that species to which action the principal commits as a function of the message m ∈ M. A discrectional-







Given Γ̂ I can dene a mechanism {M,x} that is equivalent to Γ̂. Just take M = Γ̂ and x(m) = m for
any m ∈M. Starting from {M,x} I can dene Γ̂ = x (M) . The two objects share the same properties.
Proposition 1
I want to prove that the optimal contract consists of an interval. By contradiction I assume that it is
not, or equivalently that there exist two actions a1 and a2 such that no other action a1 < a < a2 is
oered to the agent as part of the contract. It is possible to show that a protable deviation exists. In
fact if the principal oers to the agent the possibility to play a∗ = a1+a22 she will see her expected payo
increase. In order to show this I will compute the expected payo of the principal with and without a∗
in the contract and compare them. When only a1 and a2 are oered to the agent he will buy a partition
ψ =
{




24 as in the following gure.
He will play a1 when θ ∈ (θi−1, θi] and a2 when θ ∈ (θi, θi+1] . The expected utility of the principal if the









(a2 − θ)2 dθ





































I can compute the utility of the principal in the interval [a1 − b, a2 − b]:
24Remember that we are considering the case of low cost of information. Therefore the return on information is bigger than
the cost. The agent chooses θi so that his expected return on information is maximized.



















(a2 − θ)2 dθ
Simple algebra gives U∗ − U ≥ 0.
I want to nd the largest action that the principal allows the agent to take. I rst look for what the
agent chooses to acquire when his menu of options26 is
[
− 12 , α
]
































































































































































2 = 0, which gives
as solution α = 12 + b, that is not admissable. It must be α =
1
2 when c is large enough (c = ĉ). In order to
check how the solution moves with the cost parameter c we use the IFT and compute:
26Note that in low SoW the principal cannot do better than in the case where c = 0, described in Melumad & Shibano (1991).







































]2 − 3b2 + 6b [ 12 − α] > 0.
Therefore[1− α] decreasing in c and α increasing in c.
Lemma 1
Let's assume that the principal provide 3 possible options {a1, a2, a3} to the agent. I want to show that
it is not possible that the agent chooses an interval partition
{[
− 12 , θ1
]






with − 12 < a1 <
θ1 < a2 < θ2 < a3 <
1






(a1 − θ)2 −
θ2ˆ
θ1































3 − a22 − 2θ2 (a3 − a2) + 3c
[
− 14 + θ
2
1 + θ2 − 2θ1θ2
]
= 0
And the associated Hessian matrix is:
H =
 −2 (a2 − a1) + (1 + 2θ2) 3c 6c (θ1 − θ2)
6c (θ1 − θ2) −2 (a3 − a2) + (1− 2θ1) 3c
 .
Given that b = 0 if θ1, θ2 is a maximum for the agent for some {a1, a2, a3} then θ1, θ2 would be a
maximum when a1 =
− 12 +θ1
2 , a2 =
θ1+θ2




2 . In fact, the agent and the principal wants the same
action to be played (action=expectation of the posterior).
H =
 − ( 12 + θ2)+ (1 + 2θ2) 3c 6c (θ1 − θ2)





+ (1− 2θ1) 3c

and in c −→ 112
+
H =
 − 14 − θ22 12 (θ1 − θ2)
1






The matrix is negative denite if a2 =
θ1+θ2




2 < 0 and det (H) > 0 for what follows:
det (H) > 0 i 1− 2θ1 + 2θ2 + 4θ1θ2 − 4θ21 − 4θ22 > 0




This implies that if a2 ≤ 0 there is only one solution for the problem of the agent. This solution is given
by a1 = − 13 , a2 = 0, a3 =
1
3 , with θ1 = −
1
6 , θ2 =
1
6 . We notice now that this cannot be a solution because
the agent would prefer not to buy any informatioin and play a2 = 0.
This implies that a2 > 0, which contradicts the initial Hp. Hence it must be the case that the agent will
never buy an information partition with more than 2 elements.
When b > 0 I can rewrite the F.O.C.s with a′1 = a1− b, a′2 = a2− b and a′3 = a3− b. If I substitute in the












2 , I obtain the same condition as in the case where
b = 0.
Proposition 2























































































We want to characterize the solution for the problem when c > 112 and b > 0. The principal solves:
max
a1,a2
EU (a1, a2) = −
ˆ θ
− 12




(a2 − θ)2 dθ s.t.
θ ∈ argmax
θ′
EV (θ′) = −
ˆ θ′
− 12



















In order to make computation easier I adopt the following change of variables

x = a1 + a2
y = a2 − a1
with

x ∈ [0, 1− ‖y‖]
y ∈ [−1, 1]






















dθ2EV ≤ 0, iff y − 3c ≥ 0. This implies that we have only one solution when
y − 3c > 0
.
Not that when c −→ 112
+
the previous condition reads y > 14 . This would always be the case, otherwise
the contract a1 = − 14 + b, a2 =
1
4 + b would do better for the principal while not solving the FOCs. I will












2 − 12y + θx
δg
δy = x− 2θ − 2b
δU
δθ = −2θy + xy
δg
δθ = −2y + 6c

















δθ = 0⇒ λ =
x(1−y)
6c






δb = 0 +
x(1−y)
6c (−2y) = −
xy(1−y)
3c
from which we get that x ≥ 0 in order to have dUdb ≤ 0
28
The FOC on x gives




−x+ 2θy + (xy − 2θy) yy−3c
]
= 0⇒ x = 6cθy(y2−y+3c)
From x ≥ 0 we have θ ≥ 0 (note that y2 − y + 3c > 0 for c > 112 ).
This implies also that
x > 2b
otherwise we would have θ < 0 from the optimization problem of the agent.
The FOC on y gives
y : dUdy = 0 ⇒
1
4 − θ







2 − 12y + θx+
2θ−x










− (y − 9c)
(
y2 − y + 3c
)
+ 6cy (y − 6c)
]
=




−y2 + y (12c+ 1)− 9c
]
= 0
Note that y 6= 12 because otherwise the FOC on x would not be satised.
If, by contradiction, it was y > 12 ⇒ −y
2 + y (12c+ 1)− 9c > 0 which means






When c is large enough this would imply that the principal loses (for example c = 19 y > 0.56) whatever
is a1, a2 and θ, even θ = 0, a1 = − 0.562 , a2 =
0.56
2 she would get better by choosing a1 = −
1
4 + b, a2 =
1
4 + b
inducing θ = 0. 28
Remind that it cannot bey = 12 and y should be continuous in c.






From the previous proposition we know that in order to have θ beeing a solution of the maximization problem
of the agent it must be y − 3c > 0. When c ≥ 16 this condition is y ≥
1
2 meaning that the FOCs found in
proposition 3 do not have a solution.
28if b is small enough
29
We will have that y = 3c and the agent will be indierent among any θ (any form of information
acquisition). Hence, for some 112 < c
∗ ≤ 16 and for any c > c
∗ we have y = 3c and x = 2b.

















and observe that it is negative.







δc = 0 +
x(1−y)
6c (6cθ) = x (1− y) θ > 0
When c > c∗we have y = 3c and
















First, note that we can think of this problem as one where the principal maximize the expected value of
both parties (weighted by λ and (1− λ)) and she bares the cost of the information collection.
When c ≤ 112 we know that the agent is better o by buying as much information as possible. Therefore
we just need to verify for what values of λ the principal wants to induce full information acquisition or no
information at all. When the agent buys  full information he gets V = (1− λ) [0− c] and the principal
gets U = λ (0) , we have to verifry when V + U > −λ 112 , that is the utility the principal gets in anbsence of




Note that RHS is increasing in c and takes value 12 when c =
1








we know from Lemma 1 that a maximum of two actions can be induced. The principal
chooses the information partition (compatible with the incentive of the agent) that maximizes V + U and
29conveniently for the prinicipal
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The principal will choose θ′ = 0 and compare the total utility the two agents get and nd that the


































≥ (<)− λ 1
12

























In this section I want to further analyze the role of the cost functions on the results. Consider two information
partition ψ = ψA and ψ
′′ = ψB as in the Figure 1. The assumption on the cost function implies that
c (ψA) > c (ψB) .
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Remark 1
Theorem 1 of Blackwell (1953) tells us that there is a sense for which, under any reasonable measure of
uncertainty, the experiment that gives partition ψA is more precise than the one from partition ψB . My
choice for the cost function corresponds to φ ( ) = ( )
2
in Theorem 1 of Blackwell (1953). Any other convex
function would have been coherent with the theory elaborated in Blackwell (1953), but would in any case
have the same implication on how to order ψA and ψB in terms of informativeness.
Remark 2
What is important to stress is that the choice of the cost function buys me:
1. the full characterization of the optimal contract
2. A clear switch of regime from innite actions chosen in the optimal contract with c ≤ 112 to only 2
actions when c > 112 .
Whether 1. can be seen as a clear advantage for tractability, 2. might be a weakness and a possible way for
new research.
A further implication due to the choice in the cost function is that it is possible to rank and compare the
cost of information with respect to its value.
Remark 3
One possible way to go away from the original Hp on the cost function is to assume that the cost of each
partition distribution is given by the number of cuts that the agent decides to do, so that the partition ψA
and ψB have the same cost. In order to compare this case with the one studied before I will compute which








(a2 − θ )2dθ
s.to θ′ ∈ argmaxθ̂ −
´ θ̂
− 12




(a2 − θ − b)2dθ




As in the case developed in the paper the condition a1 + a2 =
1
2 − b
2 < 12 tells us that the principal is




I want to show what happens when I do not assume that the technology to learn information is a dierent
one. I assume that the agent can exert low or high eort 0 < eL < eH = 1 at cost cL < cH and learn the
state with probability eL and eH , respectively. While it is an interesting question to try to solve for the
optimal mechanism, here I will only compare which of two contract, Γ1 = [− 12 ,
1
2 ] or Γ
2 = [− 12 ,
1
2 − k] the
planner should use. If the contract chosen by the principal is Γ1 the agent choosing eL or eH has expected
utility respectively























− (θ + b)
)2
− cH









H when k is large, but he might
prefers v1H to v
1
L. The principal's utility will be larger when the agent exert more eort pushing her to choose
the contract Γ1, choosing therefore to delegate more.
More delegation as it was happening in the case of low cost information in Proposition 1 could incentivize
information collection and therefore benets the principal.
33
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Optimal intervention for network games
Julie Pinole, Lorenzo Verstraeten
1 Introduction
We study a classical network game. Players' payos are a function of their own characteristics, their actions
and the actions of their peers. We ask how a social planner should intervene on the connections among
players when she has in mind a particular objective. The planner might want to implement a given outcome,
in that case we show how she can achieve this goal at minimal cost; or she might have some resources to
spend, in that case we ask how she should allocate them in order to maximize aggregate welfare.
The type of intervention we have in mind is one that change the intensity of the connections among
players. Some examples of interventions could be the increase (or decrease) of the number of extracurricular
activities provided in a school or neighborhood context: adding book clubs, sport clubs, or any types
of groups, both physical and virtual. The social planner can also play on the cost of those activities to
incentivize or desincentivize participation. This will likely create or destroy links between individuals. We
can think of a regulator inuencing the partnership structure of rms, by encouraging local links between
rms of dierent size or dierent centrality in a national or global scale versus promoting networks of rms
similar in terms of characteristics. For instance the regulator may have voice to the chapter when nancial
cross-participation of big rms are realized. When agents are individuals, the planner can devise policies
promoting the integration of newly arrived immigrants. The principal of a school could organize study groups
where she decides their composition. For example, Algan et al. (2015) ([?]) ran an experiment in a French
university by randomly assigning students into rst-year groups. This design allowed to measure both the
actual change in the network structure and whether it aected the outcome of interest. 30
We assume that the intervention of the planner has increasing marginal cost. The more she wants to
change a connection between two individuals the larger is the marginal cost she has to pay. We rst ask
how she could achieve, at minimal cost, a specic outcome for the network game. Modifying the connection
30This paper validates our assumption that in some circumstances a social planner can actually aect a social network.
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between two individuals changes their incentives. This aects the decisions of all their peers and therefore
the equilibrium of the network game. When the planner has in mind a specic equilibrium to implement
we describe how she should modify the network structure in order to obtain her goal at minimal cost. The
rst set of results in Section 4 describes the interventions the planner should take and the cost she will
incur. We manage to be very general in the results we obtain. In fact, we provide results for directed and
undirected network. We also describe what happens when we allow the planner to change only a specic
set of connections. While the mathematics behind all these results is the one developed in the computer
science literature to solve the "nearest matrix" problem31 its application to the study of network games is
completely new. At the best of our knowledge we are the rst to think of a minimal cost intervention by the
planner as a minimal change in the adjacency matrix representing the network.
While the results obtained in section 4 are interesting per se, we could build on them to address some other
questions. We ask how a social planner, with limited resources, can modify interactions among players in
order to maximize aggregate welfare. Galeotti, Golub, Goyal (2018) ([?]), GGG from now on, are interested
to the same problem. However, they focus on how a social planner should change players' incentives with an
intervention targeting individual private values. The type of intervention we consider is instead one where
the social planner intervenes on the network structure. Following GGG, we consider the eect of the policy
on two kind of network games. The rst category are games of strategic complements; in this case players are
incentivized to engage in an activity if their peers do. The second category are games of strategic substitute;
in this case players players' incentives to engage in an activity are smaller the higher is the involvement of
their neighbors. As in GGG, we draw conclusions on how qualitatively dierent the intervention is depending
on whether we play a game of strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
We rst try to understand which players will be more aected by the intervention of the planner. We
decompose the eect of the intervention on a particular system of coordinates. The orthonormal basis
obtained by diagonalizing the matrix representing the interactions between individuals. We show that
the equilibrium of the network game can be measured in terms of the singular vectors of the adjacency
matrix of the initial network. This is interesting because it allows us to understand how the planner change
the players' incentives. We show that our intervention shares common features with the characteristics-
intervention problem of GGG: in game of strategic complements central players will be mostly aected by
the intervention; in game of strategic substitutes, instead, the incentives of neighbors are moved in opposite
31See Higham (2000)
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directions. While the similarity with GGG for this result seems reasonable, it was not at all obvious ex
ante; in fact the type of policy considered are quite dierent. Conceptually: in GGG the planner is limited
to change only the private benet of the actions of the players, therefore it is impossible for her to modify
the inuence of one player on an other one. Mathematically: in GGG the planner moves an n-dimensional
object (the vector of private benet) while we give her the possibility to change a n*n dimensional object
(the full adjacency matrix). Even if the incentives of the players are moved similarly in our case as in GGG
the way the social planner obtains her result using the two policies will be dierent.
In section 7 we try to analyze how the social planner aects the network structure. In the complement
case, we show that the decision of the planners depends on two aspects.It is important whether players
are central or not, and whether they have a high private marginal benet for the action or not. If central
players tend to have high private value, then the eort of the planner is unambiguously directed at them.
The planner will sponsor links from and towards these players. Otherwise the result would depend on which
aspect is the most important. The substitute case is more delicate. The planner will try to eliminate links in
order to form bipartite network. 32She will try to form two group in the population. Individuals inside one
group share few link across them, while most of the links are across individuals of the two dierent groups.
She achieves this by destroying links of low intensity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares our with the related literature. Section 3 describes
the model. In section 4, starting from a given network structure, we characterize the minimal cost intervention
to implement a given outcome. Section 5 exposes the planner's problem and give properties of the equilibrium
prole played on the new network. Section 6 provides a comparison between those properties and the results
of GGG. Section 7 provides an analysis of the changes that the network structure goes through. Section 8
concludes.
2 Literature Review
We study a model of game on networks that covers many important situations. They fall into two main
categories, as described by Bramoullé and Kranton (2016) ([?]): peer eects (games of strategic comple-
ments) and local public goods (games of strategic substitutes) 33. Examples of outcomes where peer eects
32In graph theory, a bipartite graph is a graph whose vertices can be divided into two disjoint and independent sets U and
V such that every edge connects a vertex in U to one in V.
33we abstract from the third topic they address, technology adoption, as adapting our model to discrete decisions is left for
future work)
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play a role range from smoking (Robalino and Macy, 2018, [?]), obesity (Trogdon et a., 2008, [?]), school
achievement (Boucher et al., 2014, [?]), delinquent behaviors (Glaeser et al., 1996, [?], to retirement sav-
ings (Saez and Duo, 2003, [?]). 34 In all those situations, I am more likely to engage in an activity if
my peers do. Those games are called games of strategic complementarities. On the contrary local public
goods games exhibit strategic substituability. I am less likely to contribute to a non-excludable good if my
peers do and I can benet from their contributions at zero cost. Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007 ([?]) depicts
various interactions of this type. For instance information and innovation are often non-excludable. If my
friends engage in information acquisition on a new consumption good, I may take advantage of it. Research
and development expenses in enterprise generate innovations that also prot connected partners. Another
dimension of technological spillovers is geography, as evidenced by Bloom et al., 2013, ([?]). A last example
is what the literature refers to as crime games. Ballester et al. , 2010 ([?]) quote the criminology literature
to support their assumption that criminal skills are mostly learnt through peers, and thus there is spillover
of crime activities from one individual to his connections. In all those examples, the exact structure of the
network matters and the aggregate outcome is relevant to policy makers.
Our work represents a new application of the computer science literature on nearest matrices. Higham,
2000 ([?]) proposes answers to dierent mathematical problems searching for a matrix with specic properties
that is as close as possible to an initial matrix deprived of this property, where dierent closeness metrics are
possible. We provide a specic application of the nearest matrix problem by dening the network structure
through its adjacency matrix and interpreting the nearest matrix solving an adequate optimization problem
as the adjacency matrix of the desired network structure.
Finally, our work contributes to the literature on optimal strategy in the presence of social interactions.
Zenou, 2016 ([?]) provides, among other things, a review of the literature on network intervention in games.
Among the economics literature we quote other recent works: Fainmesser and Galeotti, 2016 ([?]), Akbar-
pour, Malladi, and Saberi, 2017 ([?]), Banerjee, Chandrashekhar, Duo, and Jackson, 2016 ([?]), Candogan,
Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar, 2012 ([?]). Other disciplines investigates the topic. In marketing and computer
science, the problem is often whom to target: Borgatti, 2006 ([?]), Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos, 2003
([?]).





We study a game where n players are located on a directed network described by the weighted adjacency
matrix G ∈ Mn,n. 35 The set of player is called N = 1, . . . , n. The element gij of G represents how strong
the connection between players i and j is. We impose gij ≥ 0 for all i, j.
Each player i chooses an action ai from R+. We call a ∈ Rn+ the vector containing the action prole of
all the players: a = (ai)i∈N .
The payos to individual i are given by:







where bi ∈ R∗+ is an individual-specic characteristic measuring individual i's marginal return of the
direct eect of his action. We call b the vector containing the characteristics of the n players. Each player
incurs a quadratic cost. Finally, each player's payos are aected by the interaction between his own action
and the action of his connections. If β is positive, actions are strategic complement, whereas if β is negative
they are strategic substitutes.
For notation purposes we call A the following transformation of the network structure:
A ≡ I − βG (3.1)
3.2 Equilibrium
We impose the following assumption:
Assumption 2. The spectral radius of βG is less than 1.
Under assumption (2), Bramoullé, Kranton and D'Amours (2014) [?] shows that there exists a unique
equilibrium a∗ for the network game described above. Furthermore the equilibrium satises the following
system of linear equations:
[I − βG]a∗ = b (3.2)
35For some of our results we allow gii to be dierent from 0, with the interpretation that it is a factor that inuence the cost
of player i when he chooses action ai. In terms of the network structure this is equivalent to assume the presence of self-loops.
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Assumption (2) ensures that I − βG is invertible. Hence we can write
a∗ = [I − βG]−1b
4 Closest network structure to implement a chosen vector of actions
We assume that the social planner can intervene to change the structure of the network. She could do this
by changing the intensity of links across players. In this section we ask how she should do it if there is a
specic action prole ā that she wants to implement at minimal cost. For now the goal of the social planner
is to implement a given equilibrium. She might for example want to get an outcome where all the players
contribute equally (they all play the same action in equilibrium) or she might want all the players to increase
their action by a certain amount. We characterize here the minimal intervention she should design and the
associated cost. We make the following assumption about the cost she incurs to alter the network:





ij is the Frobenius norm of M.
The previous assumption captures the idea that the social planner can modify the interaction between
i and j at a convex cost. The planner faces increasing marginal costs of intervention. The Frobenius norm
can be seen as an extension of the euclidean norm to Rn×n. The closest the new adjacency matrix is to the
initial one the smaller the cost for the planner.
In the computer science literature there exists a lot of works aimed at nding the closest matrix to
a given one. Often when an algorithm is implemented some approximations are used and the matrix of
interest might lose some properties. This is why we might want to substitute the matrix obtained through
the algorithm with the closest one having the desired properties. 36 We will use the results in this literature
with a completely dierent purpose. The idea is to rewrite the planner's problem as one of nding the
closest matrix to a given one. At that point the mathematical challenges are identical to the one faced (for
completely dierent reason) in that literature and we can therefore borrow several results from there.
Denition 1. We call Q(y, x) the set of matrix quotients of y by x, with y, x ∈ Rn:
Q(y, x) = {M ∈ A|Mx = y} (4.1)
36see Higham (2000) [?].
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where A ⊆Mn,n is a set of matrices with some desirable properties.




{||E||F : (A+ E) ∈ Q(y, x) ∩ A} (4.2)
where A ⊆Mn,n is a set of matrices with some desirable properties.
Higham, 2000 ([?]) reviews results of the computer science literature that solves the minimization problem
(4.2) for dierent constraints on the type of matrices to work with (constraints dened in the set A). This is
of interest for the problem at hand as the equilibrium condition (3.2) makes our problem equivalent to the
minimization problem (4.2) with A = I − βG, x = b and y = ā.
We focus on the three types of constraints that we consider the most relevant: the unconstrained case,
the case where the starting network is undirected and we wish to reach an undirected network as well, and
the case where we want to preserve some sparseness properties of the network.
4.1 Case 1: Unconstrained intervention
The rst type of intervention we consider is one were we don't impose any constraint to the planner. A
given initial network is given and she can change any connection at a cost specied in Assumption 2. We
will provide a closed form solution to the problem of the planner and species the cost that is associated to
the intervention
For simplicity, we are now using the notation A dened in equation (3.1). Not imposing any condition
on the intervention of the planner translates in the language of the previous denitions in A =Mn,n. The
following proposition gives us the result:
Proposition 6. The least costly intervention such that the action prole ā is played in equilibrium in the













Note that ||.|| denotes the euclidean norm of Rn.
Proof. We rst quote the following lemma, which is a result coming from the section 8 of Higham, 2000 ([?]):
Lemma 2. Given y, x ∈ Rn, A ∈Mn,n, the following minimization problem:
min
E∈Mn,n
{||E||F : (A+ E) ∈ Q(x, x)}








This result tells us how to change a matrix in the sense of minimizing the Frobenius norm of the dierence
between the initial and the nal matrix, subject to the matrix belonging to Q(y, x).
The proof of Proposition (6) is a direct application of this lemma for y, x = ā, b.
The following corollary simply uses (3.1) to go from the transformed matrix of A to the transformed
matrix of G:
Corollary 1. The new network structure in the modied game is:
G(ā) = G− 1
β
Emin(ā)
reached at a cost of
||b− (I − βG)ā||
||ā||.
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Remark 1. Mathematically Emin is what the planner adds to A to reach the transformed matrix. That
is why we call Emin the optimal intervention. The rst thing to note is that the matrix Emin is of rank 1.
Therefore we say that the planner's optimal intervention is a rank-1 intervention, that is of low computational
complexity. This is true independently of the initial conditions. The second thing to note is that the optimal
intervention Emin is a priori non symmetric; this is the case even when the initial matrix is symmetric.
With this type of intervention, we are not constraining the social planner in any way. This is something
that might not be desirable in some situations. When we start from an undirected network, represented
by a symmetric adjacency matrix, it may be questionable to reach a directed network (with an asymmetric
adjacency matrix) as the outcome of the planner's optimal intervention. One desirable property that we
might ask is the preservation of symmetry.
4.2 Case 2: Symmetric intervention
In this case A = {M ∈ Mn,n such that M = MT }. The following results is another direct application of
Higham, 2000 ([?]):
Proposition 7. The closest matrix - in the Frobenius norm - in A = {M ∈ Mn,n : M = MT } to A such
that the action prole ā is played in the game played on the transformed network is:
A+ ESymmin (ā) (4.6)
with
ESymmin (ā) =
(b−Aā)āT + āT (b−Aā)T
āT ā




Remark 2. 37 -The intervention of the planner is a rank-2 matrix -It is possible to show that the cost of
intervention µSym is close to the cost of the intervention without constraint





4.3 Case 3: Sparse intervention
In some situations the planner might not be able to modify some features of the network. For example she
might not be able to create a link between player ĩ and j̃. One important case is when we do not allow for
self-loops, that is gii = 0, for any i.
Let Y be a matrix such that yij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, j. We dene the following set:
Denition 3.
S2(Y ) = {M ∈Mn,n such that Mij = 0 if Yij = 0}
From Higham, 2000 ([?]) we know that, given Y and S2 the solution to the minimization problem (4.2)







where āi ∈ Rn, with j−th element āi(j) dened as:
āi(j) =
 ā(j) if Yij = 10 if Yij = 0
For example we want to study the case where the initial and post-intervention do not have self-loops (
that is akk = 0 for all k), we dene the restrictions matrix:
B =

0 1 1 ...
1 0 1 ...
...























a21 0 a23 ...
...
... an,n−2 an,n−1 0

Remark 3. This intervention is a rank-n intervention. As noted in Dennis and Schnabel, 1979 ([?]) this
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type of correction is of no computational signicance and can be made "one row at the time". Column k of
the intervention is proportional to the non-zero entries to the objective equilibrium prole k-th component.
Dennis and Schnabel, 1979 ([?]) and other work in the computer science study other interesting case of
A. In the next section we focus on studying a problem that we consider of particular interest: How should
a planner, with a given budget, intervene on the network structure in order to increase total welfare.
5 Closest network structure that maximizes welfare
In the previous section we specied how a social planner can implement an equilibrium prole at minimal
cost. While this might be of interest per se, in this section, we will use the results we obtained to address
an important policy question: how should the social planner allocates resources to maximize total welfare.
5.1 The planner's problem
The goal of the social planner is to maximize aggregate welfare knowing that agents are utility-maximizers
and that they will play the Nash equilibrium a∗ ∈ Rn of the game described in the model. To reach this
goal the social planner can intervene on the network structure provided she respects a cost constraint. Given
A ∈Mnn (as dened in (3.1) as a function of the initial network structure G), a budget C > 0, and a vector











s.t. [A+ E]a∗(E) = b,
||E||2F ≤ C
( P[A,C, b])
where a∗(E) is the Nash equilibrium of the game played on the transformed matrix A+ E.
5.2 Equilibrium prole's reaction to planner's intervention
Even if the solution to problem ( P[A,C, b]) is very sensible to the initial conditions, we try to describe what
is the general idea behind the planner's intervention. In particular we will try to compare the equilibrium
prole of the network game before and after intervention. In order to this we will project the equilibrium
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on a particular system of coordinates and observe how these projections are aected before and after the
intervention of the planner. We will show how an appropriate choice of the coordinates system can help us
understand which player will have the incentives more aected by the planner's intervention and why.
We will rst rewrite the problem of the planner in a equivalent form. After that we will recall some
notions of matrix algebra that will use in Theorem 1 to get our result.
We use the result of proposition (6) to express the problem of the planner in ( P[A,C, b]):





s.t. C||a||2 − ||Aa− b||2 ≥ 0
( P2[A,C, b])










A solution to ( P2[A,C, b]) exists as the objective function is continuous and the constrained set is
compact. Applying the extreme value theorem yields existence of a solution. We call ã∗ a solution of
( P2[A,C, b]).
The idea is to compare the equilibrium of the initial game, with the equilibrium of the game after the
intervention of the planner. The equilibria we want to compare are n-dimensional vectors and therefore a
metric for comparison is dicult to obtain. What we will do is to choose an appropriate set of coordinates
and try to compare the projections of the two equilibria on these. In order to do this we will have to recall
some notion of matrix algebra.
Singular value decomposition In order to analyze the changes that the equilibrium action prole is
going through when the planner's intervention takes place, we introduce a common tool of linear algebra,
38see Bramoullé, Kranton and D'Amours, 2014, [?]
47
the singular value decomposition. Given a matrix M ∈ Mn,n there exists a factorization, called singular
value decomposition (SVD) of M of the form
M = UΣV T ,
where U and V are unitary matrices ofMn,n and Σ is a diagonal matrix with non-negative real numbers on
the diagonal. The diagonal entries {si}i of Σ are known as the singular values of M , the column of U (or
V ) are known as left (or right) singular vectors of M .
Case of symmetric positive denite matrices If M is symmetric and positive denite, its singular
value decomposition coincides with its eigendecomposition. In this case U = V , the column of the matrix
U are the eigenvectors of M and the singular values are its associated eigenvalues. The advantage of the
singular value decomposition over the eigendecomposition is that it always exists.
Let us consider the singular value decomposition of A:
A = UΣV T (5.2)
with ui (respectively vi) the i-th column of U (respectively V ), and si the i−th singular value, when
ranking the singular values in decreasing order. uij (respectively v
i
j) is the j−th element of the vector ui
(respectively vi). Let pi be the projection of the initial equilibrium action prole a
∗ (before intervention) on
vi and p̃i the projection of the new action prole ã
∗ (after intervention).
We add an assumption about the size of the budget. This condition is sucient for our next result to











The following theorem allows us to rank the ratio of any two projections before and after intervention.
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Proof. See section 9.1 of appendix. For the version where symmetry is imposed to the transformed network,
see section 9.3 of appendix.
The ratio of the projections of the resulting action prole on dierent right singular vectors of A tells us
how close the action prole is from one right singular vector relative to another one. By comparing this ratio
before and after intervention, we understand whether the action prole moves towards one right singular
vector relative to another one with the intervention. The next corollary formalizes this idea.
For any a ∈ Rn, let θi(a) be the angle between the vector a and vi in the 2-dimensional subspace of Rn
spanned by a and vi .











Corollary (2) means that the action prole moves towards vi and away from vj , for all i < j.
This result holds in the particular case when the singular value decomposition is the eigendecomposition
as well as in the general case when it is not. But the interpretation of the result is easier when the {vi}i are
the n eigenvectors of A. In this case it exists the eigenvectors of A and of G are the same and because the
eigenvectors of an adjacency matrix have a nice interpretation in terms of network structure, we can give an
interpretation to our result.
Remember the relationship between A and G from (3.1):
A = I − βG
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As I is a diagonal matrix, the correspondence between eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the two matrices






with vi the associated eigenvector (5.5)
and the n eigenvectors {v̄i}ni=1 of G are the eigenvectors of A ranked:
1. If β > 0: in the opposite order as {vi}ni=1
2. If β < 0: in the same order as {vi}ni=1
Proof. From (3.1) we get the following equivalence:
Avi = λiv
i ⇔ Gvi = 1− λi
β
vi (5.6)
The results directly follows.
The order of the eigenvectors refers to the orders of their associated eigenvalues ranked in decreasing order,
from the largest to smallest. The eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix capture important characteristic of
the network. We will use these to interpret the result on the projections of the equilibria. Each component
of the rst eigenvector of the adjacency matrix represents the eigenvector centrality of the corresponding
player. A high eigenvector centrality means that a node is connected to many nodes who themselves have
high centrality. The higher the j−element of the rst eigenvector is, the more central the j−th player is.
The last eigenvector, instead, in a bipartite network, assign negative values to players in one of the two sets
and positive values to the one in the other set.39 We put together corollary 2 with lemma 3 to give a result
that has a clear interpretation in terms of network structure:
Proposition 8. Under assumption 4, for i, j = 1, . . . , n, i < j:
1. If β > 0:
The equilibrium responds to the planner's intervention moving from the higher-ranked to the
lower-ranked eigenvector in the subspace of Rn spanned by those two eigenvectors.
39A bipartite network is a network whose nodes can be divided into two disjoint and independent sets U and V such that
every edge connects a vertex in U to one in V.
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2. If β < 0:
The equilibrium responds to the planner's intervention moving from the lower-ranked to the higher-




















Figure 1: Change in the relative distance between the action prole and the rst two right singular vectors
of A
Figure (1) is a graphical representation of corollary (2), for i = 1, j = 2 in the case of strategic comple-
ments. Proposition (8) says that more central agents (of the initial network), in this case player 1, as his
component of the rst eigenvector is larger, increase more their action relative to another weighting of the
agents (the weighting described by v̄2 for instance). This result tells us that the planner is changing the
incentives in the game in such a way that central players are the one more aected. They will respond more
than others to the intervention. We see the decision of the planner to target central player as a result of
the importance of these players typical of network games of strategic complements. When a central player,
after intervention, increases is action he incentivizes the players that are connected to him to increase their
action as well, bringing benets to all the populations. The more a player is central, the more his action is
important to incentivize other players. In section 7 we will try to investigate how the social planner actually
targets central players, but rst we want to explain what happens in game of strategic substitutes.
When we consider a game of strategic substitutes the two graphs of Figure 1 follow the opposite order. To
get an interpretation we focus on the last eigenvector of the network. Proposition 8 says that the equilibrium
will tend to mirror the last eigenvector (with respect to any other eigenvector) after the intervention of the
planner. To x ideas consider Figure (2). Here all the nodes are connected but some links are stronger (dark
blue) and form a biparite graph. The last eigenvector of the adjacency matrix will have positive entries for
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Figure 2: Bipartite Network
the red nodes and negative for the green. Proposition 8 is telling us that the social planner is changing the
incentives of red and green players in opposite directions. Red players, after interventions will increase their
actions while green will decrease them. Changing actions of closed neighbors in opposite direction increases
total welfare. If the planner would instead move incentives in the same direction an increase in the action of
a player would crowed out the incentive of his neighbor. In section 7 we try to understand how the planner
reaches her goal. Before, in the next section, we will compare our result to GGG.
6 Comparison with GGG
We now want to compare our result with the proposition 1 of GGG. We focus on the special case where
the singular value decomposition is the eigendecomposition. The results follow through in terms of singular
vectors. We nd that the changes in the action prole have the same direction in terms of eigenvectors,
though the amplitude of the changes is surely dierent.
Denition 4. qi(G, b) is the projection of b on the i-th eigenvector of G.
The result of proposition 1 of GGG is:
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1. If β > 0,
ql(G, bnew)− ql(G, b)
ql(G, b)
is weakly decreasing in l (6.1)
2. If β < 0,
ql(G, bnew)− ql(G, b)
ql(G, b)
is weakly increasing in l (6.2)
where b is the initial vector of individual characteristics, and bnew is the new vector, after intervention
(remember that they intervene on b when we intervene on G).
In order to compare their result and our result, let us rename our projections:
Denition 5. pi(b,G,C) is the projection of the action prole solution of ( P2[A,C, b]), with parameters
b ∈ Rn, G ∈Mn,n, C > 0, on the i-th eigenvector of G
Using simple algebra and Proposition 1 of GGG we can state:















In words, it means that the results they nd when β > 0 and β < 0 leads to the same direction of the
change in the action prole a∗ with respect to any two eigenvectors of G as in our result of proposition 8
. Note that the inequalities (6.3) and (6.4) are inequalities, telling us nothing about the amplitude of the
variation. But the variation in a∗ (our object of interest as it determines aggregate welfare) goes in the same
direction in both cases of β.
The two dierent policies used by the planner move the incentives of the players in a similar fashion.
Proposition 1 in GGG describes how the planner achieves her goal moving the private benets of the players.
In the next section we describe how the planner achieves her goal changing the structure of the network.
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7 Network structure analysis
In section 6 we saw how the social planner change the incentives of the players, studying how the equilibrium
moves after the interventions. In this section we want to give insights on how she actually achieves her goal,
in terms of which connections will be modied and how.
Following the notations of equilibrium proles, we call Ã = A+ Emin (how the matrix A is transformed
after intervention) and G̃ the new network structure. As we will study the object Emin, we rename it ∆A as
it represents what is added to the matrix A in the optimal intervention. Similarly we dene ∆G = G̃ −G.
From the denition (3.1) we get:
G̃−G = − 1
β
(Ã−A) (7.1)
Therefore studying Ã − A = ∆A sheds light on the change of network structure ∆G. We focus on
undirected network so that we can use the eigendecomposition and have an easy way to interpret the results.
Furthermore we do not set any restriction on the planner intervention. We will study separately how the
planner intervene on:
1. links arriving to a set of players
2. links starting from a set of players
Following the approach of the previous sections, we work on the projection of ∆A on the basis B of the
eigendecomposition of A:
B = {(v1vT1 ), (v1vT2 ), ..., (v1vTn ), (v2vT1 ), ..., (vnvT1 ), ..., (vnvTn )} (7.2)











We dene the following two objects of interest:
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SI(vi) is the sum of the coecients of decomposition (7.3) on the basis elements of B with vector vi as
left vector of the outer product. SO(vi) is the equivalent measure when vi is the right vector of the outer
product. With this quantity we want to capture how relevant is the eigenvector vi to explain the structure
of ∆A (the in-links are captured with SI(vi) and the out-links with SO(vi)).



























1. the (n− i+ 1)−th largest eigenvalue of G if β > 0
2. the i−th largest eigenvalue of G if β < 0
Proof. See appendix
Proposition 9 gives us information about ∆A but we are eventually interested in ∆G. Recalling (7.1),


















As a consequence we directly use the ratio
SI(vi)
SI(vj)
to inform us about ∆G. To avoid ambiguity, let us call
ri the i−th largest eigenvalue of G regardless of the sign of β, and wi its associated eigenvector. Therefore,
when β > 0, r1 = λn(G) and rp = λn−p+1(G). Those notations are merely relabeling to provide clearer
intuition of proposition 9 , as when β > 0, λi(G) is the n− i+ i-th largest eigenvalue of G, but vi stays its
associated eigenvector, that is vi = wn−i+1. We can then rewrite the expressions of proposition 9 in a more
intuitive way in the following corollary.





















Interpretation for strategic complements (β > 0) In the case of strategic complements we would like












We can thus rewrite the results of corollary 7.8, when q = 1 as:
SI(w1)
SI(wp)
= R(p)2W (p) and
SO(w1)
SO(wp)
= R(p)W (p) (7.12)
The larger is the rst of the ratio in (7.12) the more the planner is increasing the intensity of links toward
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central players. The larger the second of the two ratio in (7.12) the more the planner is increasing the
intensity of links from central players to the other individuals. We can now study the two ratio and make
some interesting observations:
• From assumption 2 we know that both the numerator and the denominator of R(p) are between 0 and
1 (and as r1 ≥ rp), as |r1 − rp| grows the more the social planner is targeting links from and towards
central players. Other thing beeing equal we can compare networks that have dierent eigenvalues and
understand how much centrality of players has a key role in the decision of the planner.
• As R(p) ≥ 1 (strict inequality for r1 6= rp), R(p)2 grows faster than R(p) with |r1 − rp|, and thus the
ratio for in-links grows faster than the ratios for out-links.
• The inner product 〈wi, b〉 describes how high the private benets of the action is for the players that
matter in the i−th direction of the network structure. For instance, w1 singles out central players and
〈w1, b〉 is high when central players have high private marginal benets from the action. The more
central players have high private value for the action relative to players important according the p−th
dimension, the more W (p) is large. The idea is that the planner has an incentive to induce links with
players that have high private benets for the action as a link with one of this player is more valuable
than a link with a similar player with lower private benet. In other words W (p) gives us the relative
size of externalities in the direction of the structural aspect described by eigenvector w1 versus by
eigenvector wp.
• W (p) can either be smaller or bigger than 1.
 If W (p) > 1, then Sk(w1)/Sk(wp), k = I,O are both strictly greater than 1, (this ) which means
that the planner focuses more budget on central players relative to the players singled out by the
dimension wp. The eects contained in the ratios R(p) and W (p) reinforce each other.
 On the other hand, if W (p) < 1, the eects of R(p) and W (p) go compensate each other. The
rst ratio pushes the planner to focus on central players, but on the other hand those players do
not have a high marginal return on the action (indicated by W (p) < 1) and the planner may want
to split her budget between central players and players with high private returns.
Interpretation for strategic substitutes (β < 0) We showed in section 6 that the social planner, in
the case of strategic substitutes, moves incentive of neighbors' players in opposite directions. We try to
understand how she achieves this goal.
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As opposed to the complement case, R∗(q) ≤ 1 and decreases as the distance between rq and rn increases.
The smaller is R∗(q) the more the planner lower the intensity of links between green players and links between
red players in Figure (2). In this way the network will tend to become a bipartite network. Green players
will invest a lot in the action and red players will do the opposite.
8 Other Interventions
Started from the results given in Section 4, it is possible to investigate other interesting problem for the
planner, as, for example, how to modify the network in order to give a minimum utility to all the players
or how to guarantee some form of equality among players or again how to increase the utility (or action) of
all the players by the same amount. The social planners, in the case where a represents eort might also be
interested in maximizing total eort. We leave these and other questions for future studies.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of theorem 1
We remind that the mathematical denition of the projection of any vector x ∈ Rn on the vector vi is:
projection of x on vi = 〈x, vi〉 (9.1)
The steps of the proof are the following: rst we derive an expression for pi by using the singular value
decomposition of A. Then, we derive properties on the equilibrium prole after optimal intervention ã∗ by
dierentiating the Lagrangian of the optimization problem. From there we get an expression for p̃i. Finally
we use the expressions for pi and p̃i to deliver a ranking of the ratios of projections at dierent indices.
9.1.1 Projection of the equilibrium prole before intervention
The equilibrium before intervention is a vector a∗ such that
Aa∗ = b (9.2)













Right hand side of (9.3) We are now using the singular value decomposition of A: UΣV T . As(
v1, . . . , vn
)











where eni is the i-th vector of the Euclidean basis of Rn, that is its i-th element is 1 and all its other













































































Expression for the projection of a∗ on vi Putting together left-hand side and right-hand side of




a∗, that is pi:











Note on the symmetric case (undirected network) When the initial matrix G (and therefore A)
is symmetric:
1. vi = ui is an eigenvector of G (and therefore of A)








9.1.2 Projection of the equilibrium prole after intervention
Let us rst derive conditions on the solution ã∗ of ( P2[A,C, b]) by writing and dierentiating the lagrangian
L(.) of the problem.














Setting this expression equal to zero we get:
(1 + 2µc)ã∗ − 2µATAã∗ = −2µAT b (9.15)




+ c we get :
−Kã∗ +ATAã∗ = AT b (9.16)




and directly using the results of (9.6) and (9.10), we reach




















9.1.3 Comparing the ratio of projections on two dierent right singular vectors
















Let's observe that assumption (4) together with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of ( P2[A,C, b]) tells us that
s2i −K > 0 ∀i. In order to establish this consider the FOCs of the lagrangian:








(Aã∗ − b)TAAT (Aã∗ − b)
||ã∗||2
=
||AT (Aã∗ − b)||2
||ã∗||2
(9.20)
Cauchy-Schwartz inequality tells us that for a matrixM ∈Mn,n, a vector x ∈ Rn, ||Mx||2 ≤ ||M ||F ||x||2.
We apply this result (note also that the Frobenius norm of a matrix and that of its transposed are the same)






















Which is equivalent to:





















where the second inequality comes from assumption (4)
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(9.23) implies, for all i:
s2i ≥ K (9.24)
We now use this result to determine whether the ratio in (9.19) is bigger or smaller than 1. The function
f : x 7→ xx−K is increasing in x i x > K (which we know from (9.24)). This implies that
(9.20)⇒ p̃i/p̃j
pi/pj
> 1 i si > sj (9.25)
In the symmetric case the projection on the left singular vectors corresponds to the projection on the
eigenvector of the adjacency matrix.
9.1.4 Proof of Corollary (2)
Corollary (2) comes directly from the fact that the projection of a∗ on vi can also be written as:
pi = 〈a∗, vi〉 = ||a∗|| ||vi|| cos θi(a∗) (9.26)
Besides, the vectors of the family {vi}i are orthonormal, therefore the norm of each of them is 1. The

















We pause a moment to consider the sign of the projections. In principle, 〈a∗, vi〉 can be either negative
or positive (depending whether the angle θi(a
∗) is bigger or smaller than 90◦. We can abstract from this
sign ambiguity by "choosing" the (right) singular vector that makes the projection positive. If a vector x is
a singular vector of a matrix with norm 1, then the vector −x will also be a singular vector of this matrix
(provided we change the sign of both the left and the right singular vectors associated to the same singular
value), of norm 1 too. Therefore we choose all the right singular vectors of A such that 〈a∗, vi〉 > 0 for all
i. Then, by continuity of the inner product, for a budget small enough, 〈ã∗, vi〉 will also be positive.
Then, combining (9.27) and theorem 1 yields the desired result.
9.2 Proof of proposition 9







(remember that K is a scalar, equal to 12µ − C and that the matrix A
TA − KI is invertible as it is
symmetric) . Going back to the eigendecomposition of A, and taking into account that A is symmetric and






































V T b (9.31)
Step 2: expression for (b − Aã∗) Another useful factorization is the one of (b − Aã∗). Directly from































V T b (9.32)








∆A vj for all i, j by using the two previous























































〈vi, b〉〈vj , b〉 (9.34)















〈vj , b〉 (9.35)










Step 6: taking the limit as C → 0 Following the previous approach, we take C → 0 and work for a
transformed network close to the initial network. We know from (9.22) that:













Step 7: Ratio as a function of the eigenvalues of G The nal step is again to transform expression












However it is to be noted that when β > 0, the order of the eigenvalues of A and G is inverted and
therefore λ1(G) is the smallest eigenvalue of G and λn(G) is the largest eigenvalue of G








We restart from (9.34) above where we just change the index over which we sum:





















Following the previous approach, we take C → 0 and can thus neglect the constant K and we get:










Step 10: Ratio as a function of the eigenvalues of G The nal step is again to transform expression










However it is to be noted that when β > 0, the order of the eigenvalues of A and G is inverted and
therefore λ1(G) is the smallest eigenvalue of G and λn(G) is the largest eigenvalue of G.
This proves the result.
9.3 Optimal intervention under symmetry constraint
From (4.7) we have that
Emin(ā) =
(b−Aā)āT + āT (b−Aā)T
āT ā
− (b−Aā)T ā āā
T
āT ā
Let us rst derive conditions on the solution ã∗ of the planner's problem under symmetry constraint by
writing and dierentiating the Lagrangian L(.) of the problem.
L(a, µ) = (aTa) + µ
[








[(1 + 2µc(aTa)− 2µ(wTw))I − 4µ(aTa)A2 − 2µ(wTa)A]a = [−4µ(aTa)A−−2µ(wTa)I]b
This give us an expression for the new equilibrium prole action (that we call a∗ in this section only).




−4µ(aT a)λ1 − 2µ(wT a)
(1 + 2µc(a
T






−4µ(aT a)λn − 2µ(wT a)
(1 + 2µc(a
T





where λi is the i-th eigenvalue of A
Dividing numerator and denominator by 2µ(aTa), calling γ = −w
Ta
aTa
> 0 and K = 1
2µaTa







2λ21 − γλ1 −K
. . .
2λn − γ
2λ2n − γλn −K
V T b (9.45)
Projecting on eigenvector vi:
a∗vi =
2λi − γ
2λ2i − γλi −K
(vi)T b
As before I want to compare the ratio of projection on dierent eigenvectors before and after intervention.
This boils down to the study of the function
f(λi) =
2λ2i − γλi
2λ2i − γλi −K
When C → 0, γ → 0 as w → 0 and K > 0. This yields the result. For K > 0, multiply by aT the
equation of the derivative of the lagrangian and divide by 2µaTa. This gives us
K = aT (2A2 − γA)(a−A−1b)
which is >0 when γ is small enough
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Chapter 3
Stopping contagion: optimal network
intervention
1 Introduction
We study contagion processes on social networks. We investigate how a social planner should optimally
intervene on the network structure to prevent them. Many welfare-relevant phenomena can be described
as contagion processes in networks. The most studied one is epidemics, in this case we investigate which
kind of prevention programs the planner should promote. Other interesting applications are the diusion of
bad rumors and fake news, or risky behaviors such as crime and smoking. We ask in all those cases which
preventive measures the planner could take. 40
We use the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model from the epidemiology literature as a convenient
way to address such processes.41 Individuals are in one of two possible states: Susceptible S or Infected I.
The probability that a susceptible individual becomes infected is increasing in the number of individuals he
interacts with who are infected. The probability that an infected individual becomes susceptible again is
exogenous and given by a parameter. This gives tractability and ts well the epidemics example. 42 The key
characteristics of those diusion processes is that my behavior or my state (sick or sound) may evolve over
time, and the transition from one state to the other may depend on the states of the individuals I interact
with. For instance, I am more likely to get infected by a disease if I meet individuals that are infected
themselves, and the more such individuals I meet, the more likely it becomes. Recently the SIS model has
been used to understand a large number of processes. In information diusion the biggest the number of
my friends knowing about a rumor, the more probable it is that I learn it, and afterwards transmit it. In
coordination games, my best response is to cooperate if my friends do so and to cheat if they do.
In this environment we work on long run outcomes and study the steady-state of the system, with the
interpretation that this represents the fraction of time each individual spends in the infected state over a
40The empirical literature on peer eects shows that teenagers are more inclined to start smoking if their friends do (Robalino
and Macy, 2018, [?]).
41see Pastor-Satorrás and Vespignagni, 2001, [?])
42It may become a limitation for other contagion processes. In the context of social conventions, the probability to switch
from one convention to another seems to depend on the convention my friends adopted in any of the two directions. We leave
the study of cases where the transition between one state to the other is symmetric across the states for future work.
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long period of time. 43
In this classical SIS framework we ask how a social planner could intervene to prevent an outbreak.
We allow the planner to decrease the probability that an infection is transmitted when a meeting with an
infected individual occurs. The planner could be a politician that promotes a campaign to increase the use
of protective measures to decrease the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. She could notify social media
users about dubious sources of information in order to prevent the spread of fake news. All these intervention
are costly, and the larger is the intervention the higher is the cost the planner has to sustain. Of course
multiple interventions constitute possible way to stop the epidemic diusion, so we ask how to reach our goal
at minimal cost. How does the policy of the social planner depends on the structure of interactions among
players? How to distribute resources in the population?
The rst important contribution of the paper is the characterization of the intervention of the planner
(Corollary 5). We managed to have an analytical solution to the problem that does not require any limitation
on the initial structure of the network. This result gives the social planner a useful guidance when deciding
how to allocate resources. It is important to stress that network-nature problem like the one we face,
where we have to deal with a large amount of information, are very dicult to solve and require a lot of
computational power. Therefore providing a closed-form solution becomes of even larger importance.
To prove our result we borrow from the literature on epidemiology and from the one of computer science.
In fact, we show that, mathematically, the problem corresponds to the transformation of the matrix repre-
senting the interactions across individuals into its "closest" negative semidenite matrix. 44 This problem is
well studied in the computer science literature, we could therefore apply some of the techniques commonly
used in that eld. While the main result is a direct application of one of these, we are the rst to use them
to study diusion processes in networks.
Even if the interventions would dier a lot depending on the initial structure of the network, we argue that
the planner intervenes in a systematic way. She tries to decrease interactions across dierent communities
43In these models the outcomes of interest are divided between short run and long run. We focus on the second one. It is
to be noted that the steady-state has a dierent meaning when working on approximate versus exact networks. In the rst
case, the system is deterministic and once the steady-state is reached, the system does not move anymore. The steady-state
then describes the fraction of individuals of each type (for instance their degree) in the infected state at each period. Of course
some individuals change state at each periods but for each type, individuals leaving the infected state are replaced by the same
quantity leaving the susceptible state, provided the population is large enough. In the case of exact networks, each individual is
unique and thus the system is stochastic and its state (which is a n-dimensional vector collecting the states of each individuals
for a population of size n) changes at each period. The steady-state can be seen as a measure of time spent in the Infected
state.
44See Higham (2000) for a survey of the literature.
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in the population and she focus on eliminating the disease in each community separately.
If, on one side, the result is unique in the literature for its generality, on the other side, there is an
important limitation. The optimal intervention might result in making an interaction with an infected
individual decrease the probability to spread contagion. This means that the planner's prevention program
should not only make the probability of contagion smaller than the initial one but it should be able to promote
immunization from interaction across individuals. While this would make sense if the infected state has the
avor of a rival good, the interpretation is not straightforward when we think about diseases. Aware of this
limitation, in example 1 and example 2, we show that when we analyze two of the most-studied networks'
structures in the literature, we should not be concerned with the problem. Furthermore, we argue that, even
when the optimal intervention requires immunization to increase from some interactions, our result is useful.
In fact, Theorem 3 gives us the exact cost of the planner's optimal program. If we only allow her to decrease
the probability of contagion from the initial one, our measure of the cost gives a useful lower bound on the
total expenditure the planner needs to prevent the spread of the disease.
In section 5 we study two families of networks. First, we consider a situation where players dier in their
degrees. Some players have an higher number of connections (degree) with respect to others. We compare
populations with dierent degree distributions. We want to compare a population where all the players are
similar (have the same degree) with an heterogeneous population (some players have an high degree and
other a small one). Using Corollary 5 we show that it is easier for the planner to prevent the spread of the
disease in the rst case. In proposition 10 we extend this result showing that, for comparable networks, the
easiest scenario to face for the social planner is one where all the players are connected among them. Finally,
we compare populations with two communities that are more or less integrated between them. We show
that the social planner's optimal strategy is to limit interactions between individuals of the two communities
no matter what is the initial conguration. We argue that these interactions are crucial to the spread of the
disease in the population and that is why are the target of the planner. Fighting the disease separately in
the two communities is the best way for the planner to defeat the disease.
71
2 Literature Review
Our paper inscribes itself in the literature on diusion processes among a population of individuals who
interact with one another. 45. There are two main modeling choices that impact the properties of those types
of processes: the structure of connections between individuals and the details of how the transmission takes
place from one individual to another. The SIS model has been examined under a wide range of connection
structures. In the benchmark version, the pattern of interactions is not xed and individuals have the
same probability of meeting any other individual at each period. This is called the homogeneous mixing
assumption. A rened version of this model is one where individuals are dened by the number of connections
they have, their degree. The homogeneous mixing assumption is maintained but some individuals meet more
people than other. Consequently the outcome varies by type of individuals. Lopez-Pintado, 2007 ([?]) and
Jackson and Rogers, 2007 ([?]) are examples of this approach. The pattern of connections is thus expressed
through the degree distribution of the population, that is, the fraction of individuals having exactly d friends
for all possible d. This modeling choice yields tractability but fails to grasp various important features of
connection patterns, such as geography or the long-term aspect of interactions. This is why we chose to
study exact arbitrary networks. In exact networks, every individual is dierent in principle and has his own
set of links.
Regarding the transmission function, Gleeson, 2013, ([?]) compares diusion processes under dierent
contagion mechanisms. The probability of contagion can be an increasing function of the absolute number
of my friends who are infected (SIS model), of the relative number of my friends who are infected (voter
model), it can follow a majority rule, a threshold rule, or an Ising Glauber model. 46 Beyond those well-
dened transmission function, Lopez-Pintado, 2007 ([?]) brings an interesting contribution to the literature
by working with an unspecied function. Lopez-Pintado, 2007 varies the properties of this function and
analyzes how her outcomes of interest change. As opposed to those papers, we chose the SIS model for its
tractability as it allowed us to deal with more complexity on the network structure side, which is our focus.
While it is really interesting to analyze the dynamic of the SIS model, we decide to focus on long run
outcomes (Steady-States). We do this for tractability and to compare our work to the economic literature.
Among the papers studying the steady-state of contagion processes, we distinguish two main objects of
interest. A strand of literature (like Jackson and Rogers, 2007, [?]) focuses on positive steady-states (where
45To see a full review on modeling dynamical systems on networks, see Porter and Gleeson, 2016 ([?])
46See Gleeson (2013) for a discussion
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at least some individuals or some types have a strictly positive steady-state value) and derive properties
of those steady-states. For instance, Jackson and Rogers 2007 provides comparative statics on the average
level of infection as a function of the dispersion of the degree distribution representing the network. Another
branch of literature explores when the steady-state is null (nobody is infected, an initial seeding of a disease
dies out before spreading) versus strictly positive (an outbreak of the epidemics occurs). Lopez-Pintado,
2007 ([?]) is an example.
We belong to this last group, but as opposed to most of this literature that focuses on which characteris-
tics of the process (ratio of the individual transmission and remission rate) allow to prevent an outbreak for
dierent network structures, we take the parameters of the process as given and we ask which network struc-
ture reaches the zero-steady-state for those parameters. Galeotti and Rogers (2013) consider an intervention
where part of the individuals get vaccination and therefore cannot be infected. Dierently from them the
planner in our case targets links and individuals. While Galeotti and Rogers (2013) considers a specic type
of network we try to give a result that generalize to all networks' structures.
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3 The Model
In this section we present the SIS model and we recall some important results on epidemic diusion from the
literature. The aim of this section is to understand which kind of network congurations favor the diusion
of epidemics and which one do not in the SIS framework. While the model was originally developed with
the aim of explaining epidemiological applications it is now used to study application such as information
diusion, learning and imitation dynamics.
We study a population of n individuals located on a network. The set of player is called N = 1, . . . , n.
The network is described by the adjacency matrix G ∈ Mn,n(R+). Each element gij of G represents the
intensity of the link between individual i and j. 47 48
We model the epidemic process in continuous time. At each time t, each individual can either be
susceptible, or infected. Let Xi(t) be the Bernoulli random variable that takes value 1 if node i is infected
at time t and value 0 if it is not. An infected node may become susceptible at a constant rate δ > 0. The
infection rate of a susceptible node i is λ
∑n
j=1 gijXj(t). Here λ is a parameter measuring the contagiousness
of the disease. The second term of the product
∑n
j=1 gijXj(t) capture the importance of the interaction
with the other players. The probability of becoming infected is increasing in the probability of nodes j being
infected weighted by the link that i shares with j.
Following Pastor-Satorras et al (2015) [?], we write the equations governing the evolution of the expec-








The term inside the expectation on the RHS of equation (3.1) when i is infected is equal to -δ (the
recovery rate) while it is equal to λ
∑n
j=1 gijXj(t) (the probability of infection) when i is susceptible.
Since Xi(t) is a Bernoulli we can rewrite equation (3.1) as:
47In the literature there are two dierent approaches to model networks. It is possible to impose that all connections among
players have the same intensity. In this case the adjacency matrix has only entrances 0 or 1. gij is 1 when there is a link between
i and j, 0 otherwise. We decide, instead, to model the network using a weighted adjacency matrix. Connections between players
can vary in intensity. We believe that this approach ts well when analyzing the diusion of diseases. This approach is also
necessary for the results we obtain
48We limit the study to symmetric networks. Links are bidirectional. i can be aected by j with the same probability as j











where xi(t) the probability that i is infected at time t.
3.1 Discussion of the epidemic threshold
It is a well known result that equation (3.2) has always one steady-state where xi(t) = 0 for all i. Sometimes
a positive steady-state exists as well. A crucial goal of the epidemics literature is to determine a threshold for
the diusion parameters λ, δ such that the initial seed of the disease does not result in an outbreak, or again
such that the zero-steady-state is the only one. We will recall two important results from the literature on
epidemics (Lemma 4 and Lemma 5) that explain the role of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix
G on the existence of an outbreak (non-zero steady state).
Epidemic threshold lower bound in the exact SIS model
Lemma 4. Let λ1 be the largest eigenvalue of G. A lower bound for the threshold of the epidemic process
λ
δ







⇒ there is no outbreak (3.3)
Proof. Following Pastor-Satorras et al (2015) [?], we revisit equation (3.2) and note that for all i,
∑n
j=1 gijXi(t)Xj(t) ≥
0. We can thus transform (3.2) into an inequality by removing the last term, and replacing expectations of
Bernoulli random variables by their probability of success:
dxi(t)
dt




This inequality holds for all i. We create a system of n inequalities, i = 1, . . . , n. We observe that setting








The fastest growing term (as t increases) of (3.5) is the one associated with the highest positive eigenvalue






⇒ the right hand side of (3.5) decays exponentially (3.6)
Therefore the inverse of the highest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix G is a lower bound for the
threshold of the epidemic process (meaning λδ ) at which the disease does not degenerate in an outbreak in
the exact model.
This rst result tells us that a sucient condition not to have an outbreak is that the largest eigenvalue
of the adjacency matrix has to be small enough with respect to the ratio δ
λ
. Intuitively this ratio measure
how fast an individual recovers from the disease (δ) with respect to how contagious the disease is (λ). We
would like the implication in (3.6) to be a double implication. While this is not always true, we show how
adding and additional assumption gives us the result.
SIS-epidemic threshold under individual-based mean-eld approximation (IBMF) We assume
that the two random variables of neighboring nodes are uncorrelated. While it seems a strong assumption,
this is the standard in the literature.49 We will keep this assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 5.
E [Xj(t)Xi(t)] = E [Xj(t)]E [Xi(t)] for all t, i, j (3.7)
Under assumption 5 it is possible to prove the following







49Pastor-Satorrar et al. (2015) study the accuracy of the individual mean-eld approximation for dierent type of networks.
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We use an individual-based mean-eld approximation (IBMF), assuming that the status of neighboring
nodes are independent, or again:
Using (3.7) in (3.9), and replacing the expectation of the Bernoulli variables by their probability, we get:
dxi(t)
dt




We choose the initial conditions so that at t = 0 we have a small number c of infected individuals and
everyone else is susceptible, so that xi(0) = c/n. One way to get insight from (3.10) is to see that as n grows
large, 1− xi(0) goes to 1, and following Pastor-Satorras et al (2015) [?], we approximate (3.10) by replacing
1− xi(0) by its limit value:
dxi(t)
dt








with x(t) the vector of the {xi(t)}i and:
A(G) = G− δ
λ
I (3.13)
To nd a solution to the system of dierential equations in (3.12), we decompose x(t) on the orthonormal
basis composed of the eigenvectors of A (which are the same as the eigenvectors of G) that we call {vr}nr=1
where vr is the eigenvector associated with λr, the r-th eigenvalue of G, where eigenvalues are ranked in



























and nally, using the fact that λr is the eigenvalue of G associated with the eigenvector vr and that from















As {vr}nr=1 constitutes a basis of Rn, the decomposition of any vector on it is unique and thus, ∀r, t:
dar(t)
dt
= ar(t) (λλr − δ) (3.17)
For each , r, t, the above dierential equation as for solution:
ar(t) = ar(0)e
(λλr−δ)t (3.18)












We determined in the previous section the relationship between the largest eigenvalue of G and the epidemic
threshold under dierent aproximations. The inverse of the highest eigenvalue of G, 1
λ1
is the exact epidemic
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threshold in the IBMF approximation, and the upper bound of this threshold if we remove assumption 5.
In this section we model the intervention of the planner and we state the main result of the paper.
We assume that the social planner can intervene to change the structure of the network determining the
diusion of the disease. If gi,j is the weight that determine the probability that i is infected from j the
planner can invest resources to to lower this probability to g′i,j < gi,j . We make the following assumption
about the cost she incurs to alter the network:





ij is the Frobenius norm of M.
The previous assumption captures the idea that the social planner can modify the interaction between i
and j at a convex cost. The planner faces increasing marginal costs of intervention. 50.
Once we established a metric on the cost of intervention of the planner we can ask what is the least
costly intervention that prevent the diusion of the disease in the population. As we discussed in the
previous section this is equivalent to impose conditions so that in steady state all the variable measuring
infection are equal to zero. Lemma 5 gives us a good starting point to solve the problem of the planner.
Having the highest eigenvalue of G less or equal to δλ is equivalent to having the matrix A(G) (dened in
(3.13)) be semi-denite negative. As a result we have that:
Corollary 4. The least costly intervention for the planner is the one that change the network from G to G′,
where G′ is the solution to:
min{||A(G)−A(G′)||, such that A(G′) is negative semi− definite}
This corollary enables us to resort to a famous result of the computer science literature: we use the
theorem 2.1 of Higham(1998)[?] to nd the nearest symmetric negative semi-denite matrix of A(G), and
to see how to perform this manipulation. Higham(1998) [?] also gives us a closed form solution for the cost
of intervening on any given network structure, as a function of λ
δ
. While the result comes directly using the
technique adopted by Higham(1998) [?] the application to the study of epidemic diusion is completely new.
50The Frobenius norm can be seen as an extension of the euclidean norm to Rn×n
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In order to state the theorem, we remind that A(G) and G have the same eigenvectors {vr}nr=1. We call
{µr}nr=1 the n eigenvalues of A(G), µr being associated with the eigenvector vr. They can be expressed as
a function of the eigenvalues of G in the following way:




The following theorem specify the optimal intervention of the planner:
Theorem 3. The planner intervenes on the network changing A(G) to Ã(G), where:
Ã(G) = V∆V T (4.2)


























Proof. The result directly follows from theorem 2.1 of Higham(1998)[?] and its proof.
We can restate the theorem in term of the new network G instead of A(G) to have a better interpretation
of the result
Corollary 5. The closest network structure G̃(G) of G such that no outbreak occurs is:
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G̃(G) = V∆V T +
δ
λ
















We are changing the all the eigenvalues of the matrix G that exceed the ratio δλ , while leaving unchanged
the ones below this ratio. All the eigenvectors of the original adjacency matrix remained unchanged.The
rst comment on the property of the new network structure regards what is known in the network literature
as the spectral gap:
Denition 7. The spectral gap is the dierence between the largest and the second largest eigenvalues of the
adjacency matrix.





then the spectral gap of the transformed network structure is 0.
This is interesting because the spectral gap has an interpretation in terms of network structure. A strictly
positive spectral gap corresponds to a network with only one component. A small but positive spectral gap
corresponds to a network with at least two communities with many within-group links and few between-
group links. After intervention and under the condition stated in proposition 6 the spectral gap will close
to zero. The new network will be characterized by communities that do not share links across them. The
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social planner isolate players into separate communities and then reduces the spread of the disease inside
each community until elimination.
It is important to note that Theorem 3 also gives us the cost of the transformation, as a simple function
of λ, δ, and the eigenvalues of G. It means that given two network structures and an epidemic threshold, we
directly have a number enabling us to rank those two networks in terms of how costly it would be for the
social planner to intervene. It can also be interpreted as how close each network is from a structure that
prevents an epidemic outbreak. In the next section we will use this information to do comparative statics
on dierent networks.
5 Applications
We discuss limitations and benets of our method, and illustrate them in three examples hereafter.
When applying the intervention described in the previous section, we see that the post-intervention matrix
described in equation (4.4) may have negative entries. Our method requires to make the matrix A(G) = G− δλ
negative semi-denite. There is not a condition that preclude the new matrix (after intervention) to exhibit
negative entries. In the epidemics framework, a link with negative intensity between two individuals is
translated into a decreased probability to be infected for one of the individuals when the other becomes
infected. This interpretation is dicult to justify in some of the applications we described.
When the minimal-cost intervention we presented make some entries of the modied network negative,
our theorem does not give information about other interventions to prevent epidemics diusion. The theorem
2.1 of Higham (1988) [?] only addresses minimization problems that do not apply constraints on the outcome
matrix properties. We therefore regard our result as a lower bound of the cost of intervention. The problem
that the planner has to solve is the same one but with the additional constraint of having the post-intervention
matrix with non-negative entries only. When this additional constraint is not binding, meaning that the
matrix G̃ dened in (4.4) has no negative entries, theorem 3 hits its full potential. It tells us what is the
intervention that corresponds to the minimal-cost intervention, and gives us a simple formula of the cost of
the intervention, allowing for quick comparative statics. We give hereafter examples where this lower bound




We consider a population of n individuals who dier in their total intensity of interaction (or equivalently
their probability of spreading the disease). Each individual i is characterized by a coecient ci measuring
his propensity of interaction. ci is drawn from a distribution C with support R+. We assume random
mixing, that is the probability of having an interaction with an individual j is proportional to j's propensity
of interaction. The strength of the link between individuals i and j is therefore:
gij = cicj
Two individuals are very likely to have an interaction if they both have an high propensity of interaction.
A dierent interpretation is that if ci measures the contagiousness of individual i it is likely that an interaction
with him will result in an high probability of infection. The network framework described in this example is
the intensity counterpart of the degree distribution framework where links are non-weighted, 0 or 1, but exist
with a probability depending on the degree of two nodes. If nodes i and j have degree di and dj respectively,
the probability that they are linked is proportional to didj . In our example, all nodes are linked, and the
weight of the link between i and j is cicj .
We will try to determine the optimal intervention of the planner and to compare the cost of intervention
for dierent distributions. In order to that, we will compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the adjacency
matrix to apply Theorem 3.
Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of G The only positive eigenvalue of G is λ1. For i = 2, . . . , n, λi = 0.

































Applying theorem 3 we can see that in order to prevent an epidemics, the planner transforms the structure









This means that each link is aected proportionally to its initial intensity.
5.1.3 Comparative statics of the cost of intervention
We wish to derive comparative statics with respect to the distribution C which determines the intensities
{ci}i.
We are interested in comparative statics with respect to the variance of the {ci}i, as it is trivial that
increasing the average of C increases the diusion of the disease and thus the cost of the intervention. The
idea is to compare a network where individuals are similar in their propensity to interaction to one where
individuals are instead heterogeneous.
In order to neutralize the eect of the mean, we compare mean-preserving spreads of C. Given the weight
of each ci is one, the mean-preserving spread will express itself through the support of the {ci}i.
Theorem 3 gives us the cost of the intervention:
||G̃−G||2F = λ1 −
δ
λ
= c21 + c
2
2 + ...+ c
2
n
We see that by taking a mean-preserving spread of the initial distribution of {ci}i, we increase the cost
of intervention.
The less spread the distribution C is, the easier it is for the planner to intervene on the network. Another
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interpretation is that as links intensities are more homogeneous, it is unambiguously easier to intervene to
prevent epidemics.
Comparison with Jackson, Rogers (2007) [?] We wish to draw a parallel with proposition 2 of Jackson,
Rogers (2007) [?] (hereafter JR), which states that when the epidemic characteristics λδ is low enough, a
mean-preserving spread of the degree distribution of the network yields higher average infection. This result
echoes ours that by spreading the intensities, it becomes more dicult to immunize the population (in terms
of higher cost of intervention). The comparison is delicate however because of the following two reasons:
• Both JR and we make comparative statics with respect to spreads of the degree distribution of the
network. The object of interest is dierent though: they show results on the average level of infection
in the (positive) steady-state, while we provide the cost of reaching a zero steady state level from
an initial network that exhibits a positive level of infection. A parallel may thus be drawn between
lowering the steady-state level of infection (in JR) and lowering the cost of reaching a zero-steady state
(in this paper). Even though it intuitively makes sense, we don't have the proof of it.
• Proposition 2 of Jackson, Rogers (2007) [?] has two elements. It states the existence of two thresholds
λ and λ̄. When λδ is low enough (
λ
δ < λ), a spread in the degree distribution yields higher average
infection. But when λδ is high enough (
λ
δ > λ̄), a spread in the degree distribution yields lower average
infection. In the rst case, the behavior of JR's model and ours is comparable (comparable in the sense
dened in the previous element). Taking a mean-preserving spread of the degree distribution increases
the average level of infection in JR, and increases our cost of intervention. This statement naturally
rises (raises?) the question of why we focus on the rst case. Our answer is the following: it makes
sense to think that what matters for total eradication is the case where λδ is low enough and we have a
low average infection, that is the rst case of JR. However this claim disregards the fact that we don't
know the dynamics of the average infection rate if we were to progressively increase (or decrease) the
spread of the degree distribution. This matters if our initial starting point places us in the case where
λ
δ > λ̄.
Hypothetical dynamics when increasing the spread in Jackson, Rogers (2007) [?] We start
from λδ > λ̄. Figure 3 is a picture of the
λ
δ with respect to the thresholds:
In this case of JR, an increase in the spread of the degree distribution decreases average infection. To
understand why a starting point at λδ > λ̄ is delicate, we refer to the proof of proposition 2 of JR. They
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Figure 3: Thresholds for the cases in proposition 2, Jackson, Rogers (2007)
resort to an intermediary variable, that they call θ, which is the average level of infection taken with respect
to a transformation of the degree distribution. The existence of two opposite reactions to a mean-preserving
spread comes from the fact that this variable θ is always increasing with a mean-preserving spread, but the
relationship between the actual average infection (that they call ρ) and θ is hump-shaped (see gure 4. The
road towards the zero steady state from θ = θ1 (on the same gure 4) consists of continuously decreasing the
mean-preserving spread, and thus θ, even though the average steady-state ρ (for instance, ρ2 > ρ1) increases
rst before decreasing. It is especially dicult to understand in which case one stands as when passing from
θ = θ2 to θ = θ3, one switches from the high zone to the low zone, but does not realize by observing the
relationship between θ and ρ (note that ρ3 > ρ2 even though we are now in the zone where ρ and θ co-move).









Figure 4: Relationship between average infection ρ and θ while changing the degree distribution, at xed λ,
in Jackson, Rogers (2007)
Insights from the comparison This potentially cyclical relationship between spread and average
infection limits the comparison between Jackson, Rogers' result and ours. Yet we refer their result as it
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shed lights on one possible mechanism for our nding. In their paper, they claim that a spread in degree
distribution boosts average infection because when the exogenous contagiousness is not favorable to the
disease (low λδ ), it is crucial to have very high degree nodes that serve as conductors of the disease, otherwise
the epidemics would die out. If this behavior is the last resort of the disease before vanishing, it makes sense




We consider a population of n agents divided into two groups of equal size: agents 1...n2 belong to group 1
and agents n2 + 1,...,n belong to group 2. Intragroup links have strenght 1− ε, intergroup links have strength
ε, with ε ≤ 1/2. Therefore links are more intense within than between groups. Such a network is represented
by the following adjacency matrix:
G =

(1− ε) (1− ε) ... (1− ε) ε ... ε ε
(1− ε) (1− ε) ... (1− ε) ε ... ε ε
. . .
(1− ε) (1− ε) ... (1− ε) ε ... ε ε
ε ε ... ε (1− ε) ... (1− ε) (1− ε)
. . .
ε ε ... ε (1− ε) ... (1− ε) (1− ε)

(5.1)
ε represents the strength of inequality between the two types of links: intragroup and intergroup links.
As ε grows from 0 to 12 , the total intensity of links does not move, but the distribution of this intensity
does, shifting from maximum heterogeneity (1 versus 0) to total homogeneity ( 12 for all links). Note that
by restricting ε to be less or equal to 12 , we focus on positive assortative matching, and do not consider
negative assortative matching (where individuals are more linked with members of the other group than
with members of their own).





, λ2 = (1− 2ε)
n
2
, λ3 = . . . λn = 0























The sign of the elements in v2 depends on the group of each individual. The
n
2 elements corresponding to
individuals of the rst group are positive, the n2 elements corresponding to individuals of the second groups
are negative.
5.2.2 Post-intervention structure



















n 0 ... 0
















The rst thing to note is that the outcome structure does not depend on ε. Regardless of the value of ε,
the planner removes all the intergroup links, and set all the intragroup links to δλ
2
n .
5.2.3 Comparative statics of the cost of intervention
We want to study the behavior of the cost of intervention as a function of the inequality of relationships



























We can rewrite the cost as a function of n:
K =

























1−2ε ≤ n (two eigenvalues are lowered)
(5.2)
Let us focus on the case where there is intervention (that is n > 2 δ
λ







As a direct application of Theorem 3 we have:51




















As a whole, the cost of intervention for the planner is weakly decreasing in ε (strictly decreasing for ε < ε̄
and then stable). The more isolated the two communities are, the more dicult it is to eliminate the disease
in this setup. One potential explanation would be that decreasing the diusion in one group has spillovers on
the other group, reducing the spread of the disease there too. The more linked the communities are ex-ante,
the bigger this eect is. This can seems contradictory to the ex-post structure described in (5.4) where
the intergroup links intensity is lowered from ε to 0. Our result shows that the extra cost of intervention
on intergroup links resulting from an increase in ε is more than compensated by the extra saving made on
intragroup links. We can see it analytically, by computing the derivative of the cost with respect to ε. In
order to separate the two eects, we rewrite the costs under another form, directly coming from the formula
of the Frobenius norm for ||G − G̃||2F . There is the same number of links of each type, n
2
2 , we can thus
compare the change of cost per link with respect to a change in ε:
• Marginal cost of intragroup link change: 2ε








as the second eigenvalue remains under the threshold δ
λ
and the intervention concentrates on
lowering the highest eigenvalue λ1, which is independent of ε. However on [0, ε̄], the second eigenvalue is beyond the threshold
δ
λ
, decreases with ε and consequently lowers the cost of intervention.
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which is strictly negative for ε < ε̄. The cost savings on the intergroup links more than compensate for
the extra cost on intragroups links when we increase ε.
We can compare this eect of ε on the cost of eradicating the disease with Galeotti, Rogers (2013)
[?]. They intervene at the group level, as in this example. They consider an intervention where part of the
individuals get vaccination and therefore cannot be infected, as opposed to our intervention that targets links.
They nd that, under positive assortative matching (our setup), the planner should spread its immunization
eort equally across both groups (Proposition 2). Our result is compatible with theirs. The planner acts
symmetrically with regard to groups. However their cost of immunization necessary to eradicate the disease
does not depend on the relative weight of intragroup and intergroup links. It would be interesting to further
study the dierence between the two methods to understand whether passing from a n dimension intervention
to a n2 dimension intervention grants substantial benets.
5.3 Example 3: homogeneous versus heterogeneous networks
We want to generalize what we found in the previous two examples. In both cases, in fact, it results that
for the planner it is more dicult to intervene when the population is heterogeneous in terms of the link
structure.
We dene homogeneous networks in the following way:
Denition 8. Let G ∈ Mn,n be the adjacency matrix of a network. If there exists a number x ∈ R, x ≥ 0
such that:
gij = x for all i, j
then the network is said to be homogeneous.
The network dened in Denition 2 is one where all the individuals are equally connected to the others.
We want to compare this network with one where the population is instead heterogenous.
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The next proposition tell us that it is always cheaper to intervene in an homogeneous network:
Proposition 10. Consider two networks where the sum of the intensity of all connections is equal to 1.
The rst network is homogeneous, the second is not. The cost of intervention in the rst network is strictly
smaller than the cost in the second.
Proof. We can associate to the adjacency matrix of any homogeneous network a corresponding stochastic
matrix and use the theory of Markov chains to derive some insights on the planner's intervention. (see Levin
et al., 2006, [?])
When the sum of elements of each column of the matrix is constant and equal to 1, the largest eigenvalue















































2 + ...+ λnvnv
T
n
where λ1, λ2, ..., λn are the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix and v1, v2, ..., vn are the corresponding
eigenvectors.
We can compute the total number of connections in a network summing all the entries of the adjacency









Similarly, summing all the entries of the matrices obtained from the eigendecomposition (weighted by

















Given that we want to compare two network with the same number of links we ask that the two previous

























We note that the dot product vTi (
1√
n
) can be written as ||vi|| ∗ ||
1√
n
||cosθi where θi is the angle between
the vector
√




||2cos2θ1 + λ2||v2||2 ∗ ||
1√
n






2θ2 + ...+ λncos
2θn
whre the last equality comes from the fact that the eigenvectors have length 1 (from the singular value
decomposition). Note also that cos2θi ∈ [0.1]. Finally observe that cos2θ1 + cos2θ2 + ...+ cos2θn = 1, being
v1, v2, ..., vn an orthonormal basis for Rn
Therefore we know that λ∗1 can be written as a convex combination of the eigenvalues of the non-
homogeneous network. This implies that at least one of the eigenvalue of the non-homogeneous network
is larger than λ∗1. As a direct consequence of Theorem 1, we know that the cost of intervention for the
non-homogeneous network must be bigger.
6 Conclusion
We investigate contagion processes among a networked population. We use results from linear algebra
applied to computer science to nd how to prevent contagion from an initial seed. For a given diusion
process and an arbitrary given initial network, we give the closest network to the initial one such that no
outbreak occurs. We provide intuition on what the intervention on the network structure looks like by
92
analyzing relevant examples of connection patterns. We discuss the limitations of our result together with
the potential for future research.
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